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STATEMENT OF JURISDICTION
This Court has jurisdiction over this matter pursuant to

UTAH CODE ANN.

§ 78-2a-3(2)(k) (Supp. 1995).
STATEMENT OF ISSUES
Utah Farm Bureau does not contest the issues as stated by the Plaintiffs.
However, Utah Farm Bureau does challenge the Horrells' assertion that this Court
can determine that any error was harmless by applying a de novo standard. The
trial court, by ordering a new trial, has already determined that the error was
prejudicial. This Court has recently held that it does "not reverse a trial court's
decision to grant or deny a motion for a new trial absent an abuse of discretion."
Rasmussen v. Sharapata, 895 P.2d 391, 396 (Utah Ct. App. 1995). This standard
should apply to the trial court's determination that its error regarding the burden
of proof was harmful.
CONSTITUTIONAL PROVISIONS, STATUTES,
ORDINANCES AND RULES
There are no controlling constitutional provisions, statutes, ordinances, or
rules.

STATEMENT OF THE CASE
A.

NATURE OF THE CASE
Utah Farm Bureau is not dissatisfied with the Horrells' statement regarding

the nature of the case.

B.

COURSE OF PROCEEDINGS
Utah Farm Bureau is not dissatisfied with the Horrells' statement regarding

the course of proceedings.
C.

STATEMENT OF FACTS
Before setting forth a more complete Statement of Facts, Utah Farm Bureau

wishes to correct an error in the Horrells' Statement of Facts. The Horrells state
in paragraph 3 of their Statement of Facts that Utah Farm Bureau's adjuster
"hoped that the Horrells would 'go away' during this period time." Brief of
Appellant, p. 5.
Utah Farm Bureau has examined the citations to this particular contention.
(R. 2323, 2024.) The record at page 2323 sets forth the testimony of Arlene
Beckstrom, the mortgagee on the property, who was totally unrelated to Utah
Farm Bureau or the adjustment of the claim. The testimony at R. 2024 does not
contain any reference to "hope" or anything resembling the Horrells' assertion.
Perhaps the Horrells are referring to R. 2026, a portion of which states:
Q.
A.

You hoped he'd go away, didn't you?
Well, to be honest, there's a lot of people that do-when we ask
for a proof of loss that don't follow through with their claim
and do go away.

R. 2026. Mr. Bachmann's testimony related to the fact that the Horrells failed to
submit a completed Proof of Loss after being advised to do so by Utah Farm
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Bureau. As set forth more fully below, Mr. Bachmann intended to convey the fact
that many people do not continue with claims when required to state under oath
that they did not start the fire. It is extremely unfair for the Horrells to assert that
Mr. Meade's question was Mr. Bachmann's answer. At no time did Mr.
Bachmann state that he hoped the Horrells would go away.
In order to provide this Court with a more comprehensive statement of
facts, Utah Farm Bureau sets forth the following.

To prove an incendiarism

defense, most states have required evidence of 1) incendiary nature; 2) opportunity; and 3) motive. Emasco Ins. Co. v. Way mire, 788 P.2d 1357, 1360 (Mont.
1990). Utah Farm Bureau has conformed its Statement of Facts to these elements.
INCENDIARY NATURE OF THE FIRE
1.

On October 3, 1990, at 11:29 p.m., the South Salt Lake Fire Depart-

ment was called to a fire at the Horrells' residence. R. 2863.
2.

Captain Michael Larsen was one of the fire-fighters called to battle the

fire. He testified that the fire was consistent with an accelerated fire while he was
attempting to extinguish it:
Q.

A.

Q.

Well, when you went in to fight that fire, based on your observations, how was the fire responding to your water and what
did that mean to you?
Well, I had some very bad reactions with the water. Every time
we moved it to the right, we'd get a flareup of the fire and it
would roll over our heads.
What did that mean to you?
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A.

That meant that I had a flammable liquid, an accelerant in that
fire.

R. 2870. Captain Larsen also observed ?,V-patterns,,f which is indicative that a
chemical or accelerant is burning. R. 2888.
3.

Captain Larsen further testified that his observations convinced him

that the fire had started in two separate locations, not one, when the fire
department arrived. R. 2876.l
4.

After the fire was extinguished, the South Salt Lake Fire Department

returned possession of the home to Mr. Horrell at approximately 2:48 a.m. R.
2138.
5.

At approximately 4:35 a.m., the South Salt Lake City Fire Department

was called back to the Horrell property for a second fire. R. 2138.
6.

Shawn Irvine, one of the firefighters attempting to extinguish the

second fire, testified that it would be difficult to reignite a building after 30,000
gallons of water were used to extinguish the first fire. R. 2146.
7.

Mr. Irvine also testified that when he arrived for the second fire the

roof was burning, which surprised him:

1

Under such circumstances, the probability that the fire was accidental is
extremely remote because it would require an accident in each location at the
same precise moment.
C:\WP51\HORRELL\101227.BR
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A.

Q.
A.

I noticed heavy flames issuing from the rooftop. And I was
looking over the hobby shop to see that the roof on the house
was burning.
Did that surprise you in light of the 30,000 gallons of water?
Very surprised.

R. 2158.
8.

Captain Larsen characterized the second fire as "accelerated":

Q.

And how did the second fire you fought compare with the first
fire?
The second fire, to me, was more surface fire, more of a rapid

A.

burn, rapid build up, accelerated.
R. 2893.
9.

Randy Jacobson is a firefighter and fire investigator for South Salt

Lake City. R. 2647. Mr. Jacobson was assigned to perform a cause and origin
investigation into the fire at the Horrell premises. 2653.
10.

Mr. Jacobson testified that there are only two causes for a fire:

accidental and incendiary. R. 2655.
11.

Mr. Jacobson examined the electrical system and found no evidence

of a short or other accidental cause of the fire. R. 2656.
12.

Based upon his investigation into the fire, Mr. Jacobson rendered an

opinion that the fire was incendiary and that Greg Horrell started the fire. R.
2725-2729. The basis for this opinion included not only Mr. Jacobson's conclusion
that there was no accidental cause of the fire, but also that an examination of Mr.
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Horrell's story and his many financial problems pointed to him as starting the fire.
Id.
13.

Shortly after the fire, Robert "Jake" Jacobsen (not related to Randy

Jacobson) was retained to investigate the fire on behalf of Utah Farm Bureau. Mr.
Jacobsen was also able to eliminate any "electrical or accidental causes" and
concluded that Mr. Horrell set the fire:
Q.
A.
Q.
A.

Now, when you say "the insured cannot be eliminated," did
you eliminate electrical and other accidental causes?
Yes.
Did you ever eliminate the insured as the one who set the fire?
No.
* * *

Q.
A.
Q.
A.

I take it you have an opinion on whether or not the insured set
the fire?
I do.
And can you tell—could you tell us what that opinion is?
My opinion is that Mr. Horrell set this fire.

R. 3150-51.
14.

Mr. Jacobsen also rendered the opinion that the first fire originated

in two separate, unconnected, locations. R. 3110.
15.

One basis for Mr. Jacobsen's opinion that Mr. Horrell set the fire was

that an accelerant was used:
Taking into consideration that the fire department took about a fourminute response, this fire was going. It was involved and fully
involved upon their arrival. For those conditions to occur, this fire
was accelerated. It had to have had something other than an accidental
cause for it to ignite to get to those conditions.
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R. 3152. Mr. Jacobsen further testified:
Q.

A.

And to have an advanced fire like that, do you have an opinion
as to whether or not an accelerant has to be involved in order
to create that?
An accelerant of some type has to be involved. There's no
doubt about it. I can walk over and light that chair up, and we
can all sit here for five or ten minutes and watch it burn. I
mean, it is not just going to burn that violently. Eventually it
is going to get going as with anything in this room. But to have
it advance to the conditions that they found as testified by Mr.
D'Emal and the first arriving officers and the fire crews it had
to have some help.

R. 3158-59.
16.

Another basis for Mr. Jacobsen's opinion was that the home was

locked when the fire department arrived. R. 3162. Mr. Horrell's theory was that
an unidentified "shooter" started the fire. (See "Opportunity" Section, infra). Mr.
Jacobsen opined that the securing of the home served another purpose:
It's my opinion that when this fire was set, Mr. Horrell didn't want
anyone to put it out. There's two things that come into play when
considering that: One, that the house was locked up. That would keep
anyone from going in and getting hurt or going in and putting out the
fire. The other thing that comes into play is that shooting incident.
The shooting incident was nothing more than a red herring, and—to
try and make sure that his buddy, Mr. D'Emal wasn't going to be a
hero and go in and try to put the fire out in Greg's house.
R. 3162.2
2

The firefighters found no evidence of forced entry. R. 3163. As a
result, Mr. Horrell's theory presumes that the "shooter" started the fire and
then took due care to lock the home with the key prior to departing. R. 3163.
Another firefighter testified that one door was unlocked when he arrived. But
C:\WP51\HORRELL\101227.BR
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17.

Mr. Jacobsen's opinion was also based upon the financial problems

experienced by Mr. Horrell. R. 3178-79.
18.

On February 4, 1991, Mr. Jacobsen set forth his opinions in a report

to Utah Farm Bureau, stating his views that the fire was of suspicious origin and
that Mr. Horrell's statements were so inconsistent as to raise a concern of
deception. R. 3165-3167. (See Report, attached as Exhibit "A").
19.

In early November, 1990, Jake Jacobsen provided evidence samples

to Dr. Robert Lantz, an analytical chemist.

R. 3062.

Included were carpet

samples from the utility room and another area of the home, as well as some glass,
and a control sample of carpet from the home. R. 3062-63.
20.

Based upon his chromatograph studies, Dr. Lantz determined that the

chemicals found on the samples matched mineral spirits, kerosene, or paint
thinner, all highly flammable compounds. R. 3080-3082.

(See Report of Dr.

Lantz, attached as Exhibit "B").
21.

Mr. Robert Adamson, one of Mr. Horrell's "gamer" friends, testified

that Mr. Horrell kept solvents and other flammable compounds in his store:
MR. MORGAN: And did he have any flammable in the store?
A.
Yes, a spray primer had some flammable solvents; any of the
enamel-based paints had flammable solvents. That's probably
the extent of most of them.
this is of little use to Mr. Horrell, who told Mr. Jacobsen that the home was
locked.
C:\WP51\HORRELL\101227.BR
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R. 2970.
OPPORTUNITY
22.

On the night of the fire, Mr. Horrell was playing a hobby game called

"Fantasy Hero" at his hobby store which neighbored his home. R. 2336.
23.

One of the game's participants, Jacques D'Emal, testified that Mr.

Horrell appeared "a little agitated." R. 2351.
24.

Another of the participants, Robert Adamson, testified that Mr.

Horrell was more "fidgety" than normal. R. 2958. He further testified that Mr.
Horrell was less focused:
A.

Okay. Well, normally Greg was very involved, very fixed or
focused on the game that he was playing. But that night he did
get up on several occasions and moved things about in the
store, go back to the house, do various things. And he also had
an intercom set up that went back into the house. And he did
that sometimes when he had his—when he had his kids at home.
He was making sure they were asleep.

R. 2955.
25.

During the course of the evening, Mr. Horrell left several times. (See

Exhibit 222, which summarizes Mr. Horrell's actions on the night of the fire,
attached as Exhibit "C").
26.

Mr. Dave Wiggins, one of the participants at this game, left at

approximately 11:00 p.m., and only Mr. Horrell and Mr. D'Emal remained. R.
2972.
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25. Mr. D'Emal testified that at about 11:00 p.m. on the night of the fire,
he was loading his game materials into his vehicle when he heard a noise:
Q
A
Q
A

And after you heard this noise, when did you next see Greg?
I heard the noise, closed my car door, turned and Greg came
running out of the store.
And did he say anything to you?
He yelled at me to run because someone was shooting at him.
* * *

Q
A

A.
Q.
A.
Q.
A.

Where did you go?
Diagonally, across Main Street to a small lot, vacant lot, very
small, that's behind a used car lot or used to be a used car lot.
I'm not sure what it is now.
And were you able to see the property from where you were
standing?
The store front, yes.
Could you se the house?
You can't see the house from the street.
Did you observe flames at some point in time?
After Vd been standing therefor a few minutes, I noticed there
was a glow and some embers flying up from over the top of the
building next door to Greg (Indicating).

R. 2342-43 (emphasis added).
MOTIVE
27.

The home involved in the fire was sold to the Horrells by Arlene

Beckstrom in 1983. R. 2287.
28.

On March 27, 1990, a foreclosure report was issued. R. 2050.

29.

On April 20, 1990, a Notice of Default was issued. Id.

30.

A Notice of Trustee Sale was issued on October 2, 1990, one day

prior to the fire. R. 2051, 2303-04. (See Exhibit 96, attached as Exhibit f,DM).
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31.

Between 1983 and 1990, the Horrells gave Ms. Beckstrom many

checks in payment on the note which wouldn't clear the bank. R. 2288.
32.

The Utah Farm Bureau policy of insurance was applied for by Mr.

Horrell on July 27, 1990. R. 2051.
33.

Due to an unfavorable credit report, Utah Farm Bureau sent a Notice

of Cancellation on August 31, 1990. Id. (See Notice of Cancellation, attached as
Exhibit "E").
34.

The policy of insurance was to be cancelled effective October 4, 1990,

at 12:01 a.m., approximately 30 minutes after the fire started. Id.
35.

In the two years prior to this fire, Utah Power & Light sent 16 "final

notices" to the Horrells indicating that if payment was not made, the power would
be terminated. R. 2943. Utah Power made 12 personal visits to the Horrells in an
attempt to collect overdue payments. Id. In the four months prior to the fire (June
25, 1990, through October, 1990), the Horrells made no payments on their power
bill. R. 2944.3

3

These facts give the Court some flavor of the financial incentives Mr.
Horrell had to light the fire on October 4, 1990. There is a wealth of additional information which also shows the Horrells' dire financial straits, but to detail
each item would exhaust the page limitation of this brief.
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OTHER SUSPICIOUS CIRCUMSTANCES
36.

Shortly before the fire, the Horrells decided to take a three day trip

to Vernal, Utah. R. 1616.
37.

For this reason, they packed up all their clothes and their children's

clothes and left town on October 2, 1990. R. 1614.
38.

However, when the family reached Park City, they decided to return,

ostensibly because Mrs. Horrell needed to meet a Mountain Fuel employee the
next day at her mother's home to light the pilot light on her furnace. R. 1615.
39.

The Horrells got a room in Park City, 45 minutes from home, and

returned to Salt Lake City the following day (October 3).

During the early

evening, Mrs. Horrell decided to stay at her mother's home with her children,
allegedly due to power problems at their home. R. 1948.
40.

As a result, all of the family (except Greg Horrell)4, their clothes, and

essential necessities were out of the home at the time of the fire.
DECISION TO DENY CLAIM
41.

A few days after the fire, Larry Bachmann, an adjuster for Utah Farm

Bureau, instructed another employee to retain an independent adjuster, David
Rawlings, and a cause and origin expert, Robert "Jake" Jacobsen. R. 2047.

4

As stated earlier, Greg Horrell played fantasy games at his hobby shop
that evening.
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42.

Mr. Bachmann instructed Mr. Rawlings to do a "scope of loss" to

determine if the home was a total loss and to obtain an appraisal to determine its
value. R. 2048.
43.

On October 25, 1990, Mr. Rawlings reported that Mr. Horrell had

discussed the home with the building inspector and was advised that he would not
be allowed to repair the home. R. 2049.
44.

Prior to the denial, Mr. Bachmann had in his possession the Foreclo-

sure Report, the Notice of Default, and the Notice of Trustee Sale. R. 2050-51.
45.

Mr. Bachmann also had the information relating to the Utah Farm

Bureau policy and the fact that it was due to expire 30 minutes after the fire was
started. R. 2051.
46.

Mr. Bachmann received the statements of Mr. D'Emal, Mr. Adamson,

and Mr. Wiggins which indicated that the Notice of Trustee Sale was posted at the
residence prior to the fire. R. 2052.
47.

On November 2, 1990, Mr. Bachmann sent Mr. Horrell a letter

indicating that a Sworn Statement and Proof of Loss were due within 60 days and
that the claim was still under investigation, and that the investigation could not be
completed until the Proof of Loss was submitted. R. 2053.
48.

Prior to denying the claim, Mr. Bachmann was aware that Mr. Horrell

had filed bankruptcy on November 15, 1990. R. 2055. Mr. Bachmann reviewed
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the bankruptcy schedules and was concerned because there were inconsistencies
between the statements given by Mr. Horrell and those schedules. R. 2055-2062.
49.

The Proof of Loss that was submitted did not contain information on

the amount of losses Mr. Horrell was claiming. R. 2063. Upon receipt of that
Proof of Loss on January 21, 1991, Mr. Bachmann wrote to Mr. Horrell and
indicated that the Proof of Loss was inadequate, that it needed to be completed
before the claim could be considered, and to contact Mr. Bachmann if he had any
questions concerning the Proof of Loss. R. 2065-66.
50.

On February 4, 1991, Mr. Bachmann received Mr. Jake Jacobsen's

cause and origin report indicating that he was unable to identify any accidental
cause for the fire, and that the fire was intentionally set and the insured was
probably responsible for it.

R. 2068-69.

(See Report of Robert Jacobsen,

attached as Exhibit "A").
51.

Mr. Jacobsen included in his report statements from the other

participants in the fantasy game and his conversations with the fire department. R.
2069.
52.

Despite Mr. Bachmann's letter regarding the inadequacy of the Proof

of Loss, Mr. Horrell did not submit a Proof of Loss until October 18, 1991. R.
2074.
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53.

On December 28, 1991, an examination under oath was taken from

Mr. Horrell. R. 2070. This is "always" done after the completed Proof of Loss is
submitted so that the company knows what is claimed. R. 2070-71. (The delay
between receipt of the Proof of Loss and the Examination under Oath was
apparently due to scheduling conflicts between the counsel involved. R. 2076).
54.

On March 18, 1992, Mr. Bachmann denied the claim. R. 2077. The

primary basis for his denial was that the fire was of incendiary origin and that Mr.
Horrell set the fire. R. 2077-2078. Mr. Jacobsen's report outlined that there were
two distinct locations of fire during the initial fire. R. 2078. Mr. Jacobsen also
included the report from Dr. Lantz stating that an accelerant such as mineral
spirits, paint thinner, and kerosene, was used to start the fire. R. 2079-80. Mr.
Bachmann was also aware that Mr. Jacobsen was not able to rule out any
accidental cause of the fire and was not able to rule out the insured as the person
who set the fire. R. 2079. (See Denial Letter, Exhibit 463, attached as Exhibit
"F").
55.

Mr. Bachmann also took into account the numerous inconsistencies

between Mr. Horrell's statements to the fire department, Mr. Jacobsen, and the
bankruptcy court regarding various matters. R. 2082.
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SUMMARY OF ARGUMENTS
I.

The trial court correctly concluded that Utah Farm Bureau should not

have been required to prove its contractual defenses by clear and convincing evidence. The overwhelming majority of courts have held that the proper standard of
proof for an incendiarism or misrepresentation defense is a preponderance of the
evidence. Verrastro v. Middlesex Ins. Co., 540 A.2d 693, 695-96, n.2 (Conn.
1988).
These courts properly recognize that the incendiarism and misrepresentation
defenses are contract defenses under the policy and should be treated similar to
other contractual issues. Italian Fisherman, Inc. v. Commercial Union Assur. Co.,
521 A.2d 912, 913 (N.J. Ct. App. 1987); Whitlock v. Old American Ins. Co., 21
Utah 2d 131, 442 P.2d 26, 27 (Utah 1968). Because Utah Farm Bureau was doing
no more than proving another provision of the same contract upon which the
Horrells base their claim, the same burden should be applied to each party.
Many courts adopting the preponderance standard do so because the
elements of the incendiarism or misrepresentation defenses do not mirror fraud.
Rego v. Connecticut Ins. Placement Fac, 593 A.2d 491, 495 (Conn. 1991). In
neither defense need the insurer prove that the insured intended to deceive it, nor
must the insurer prove that it relied upon the insured's representations to its
damage.
C:\WP51\HORRELL\101227.BR
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There is no authority for the Horrells' proposition that because incendiarism
is also a crime, a higher standard should apply. On the contrary, the Utah Supreme Court has held that where a defendant alleges a crime as an affirmative
defense in a civil action, the preponderance of the evidence standard applies. Auto
West, Inc. v. Baggs, 678 P.2d 286 (Utah 1984).
The significant public policy in deterring incendiarism and the difficulty in
proving the defense also warrant application of the normal civil burden.

If a

higher burden were imposed, the ability of insurers to prove incendiarism would
be eliminated. Dairy Queen of Fairbanks v. Travelers Indem. Co. of Am., 748
P.2d 1169, 1172 (Alaska 1988). The Utah Supreme Court has held that arson can
be proven by circumstantial evidence because it is often secretly planned and
initiated. State v. Dronzack, 671 P.2d 199, 200 (Utah 1983). The fact that a
stigma may attach to the crime of arson is insufficient to raise the standard of
proof.
Utah Farm Bureau's claims are not those of "avoidance." The Utah Supreme
Court has already held that when an insurer asserts an exclusion to coverage as an
affirmative defense, the exclusion need only be proven by a preponderance of the
evidence. Whitlock v. Old American Ins. Co., 21 Utah 2d 131, 442 P.2d 26, 27
(Utah 1968).
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II.

The trial court did not err in concluding that its error was harmful.

This determination should not be overturned absent an abuse of discretion. Rasmussen v. Sharapata, 895 P.2d 391, 396 (Utah Ct. App. 1995).
The Horrells argue that the jury already concluded that Mr. Horrell did not
start the fire. However, this is based upon a comparison of separate bodies of
evidence. When asked to determine whether Mr. Horrell set the fire, the jury was
allowed to consider all evidence presented at trial. However, when determining
whether the claim was fairly debatable, the jury could consider only that evidence
known to Utah Farm Bureau at the time of the denial.

Thus, the Horrells'

argument that the jury's determination with respect to the fairly debatable issue is
controlling with respect to the issue of whether Mr. Horrell set the fire is
comparing "apples and oranges."
Between the time the claim was denied and the trial, Utah Farm Bureau
obtained even more evidence indicating that Mr. Horrell set the fire, evidence
which the jury could not consider when making its fairly debatable determination.
While the Horrells may dispute this evidence: "The jury, not the appellate court,
should weigh the evidence and assess witness credibility." State v. Brown, 853
P.2d 851, 860 (Utah 1992).
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ARGUMENT
I.

THE TRIAL COURT DID NOT ERR IN GRANTING A NEW
TRIAL ON THE GROUNDS THAT THE BURDEN OF PROOF
ORIGINALLY REQUIRED WAS INCORRECT,
The trial court correctly concluded that it erred by requiring Utah Farm

Bureau to prove its defenses of incendiarism and misrepresentation by "clear and
convincing evidence" rather than a "preponderance of the evidence." The trial
court's conclusion is supported by the overwhelming weight of authority from
other jurisdictions and analogous decisions from the Utah Supreme Court.
Therefore, the trial court's order granting Utah Farm Bureau's motion for new
trial should be affirmed.
A.

THE OVERWHELMING MAJORITY OF COURTS APPLY
THE PREPONDERANCE OF THE EVIDENCE STANDARD.

The parties agree that vast majority of jurisdictions addressing this issue
have held that an insurer must prove its defense of incendiarism and misrepresentation by a preponderance of the evidence. The Supreme Court of Connecticut
surveyed the case law in 1988 and concluded that twenty-two states found the
preponderance of the evidence standard to be applicable while only three applied
a clear and convincing standard:
We have examined case law from twenty-five states that have
considered the standard of proof in a civil arson case. Twenty-two
states have applied the preponderance of the evidence rule: Mueller
v. Hartford Ins. Co. of Alabama, 475 So.2d 554 (Ala. 1985); Godwin
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v. Farmers Ins. Co. of America, 129 Ariz. 416, 631 P.2d 571 (1981);
Haynes v. Farm Bureau Mutual Ins. Co. of Arkansas, 11 Ark.App.
289, 669 S.W.2d 511 (1984); Lawson v. State Farm Fire & Casualty
Ins. Co., 41 Colo. App. 362, 585 P.2d 318 (1978); Precision
Printers, Inc., v. Central Mutual Ins. Co., 175 Ga. App. 890, 334
S.E.2d 914 (1985); Dean v. Ins. Co. of North America, 453 N.E.2d
1187 (Ind. App. 1983); Neises v. Solomon State Bank, 236 Kan. 767,
696 P.2d 372 (1985); Clifton v. Louisiana Farm Bureau Casualty Ins.
Co., 510 So.2d 759 (La. App. 1987); Trempe v. Aetna Casualty &
Surety Co., 20 Mass.App. 448, 480 N.E.2d 670 (1985); United
Gratiot Furniture Mart, Inc. v. Michigan Basic Property Ins. Ass.,
159 Mich.App. 94, 406 N.W.2d 239 (1987); DeMarais v. North Star
Mutual Ins. Co., 405 N.W.2d 507 (Minn. App. 1987); Britton v.
Farmers Ins. Group (Truck Insurance Exchange), 111 P.2d 303
(Mont. 1986); Italian Fisherman, Inc. v. Commercial Union Assurance & Co., 215 N.J.Super. 278, 521 A.2d 912, cert, denied, 107
N.J. 152, 526 A.2d 211 (1987); Yassoo Enterprises, Inc. v. North
Carolina Joint Underwriting Assn., 73 N.D. App. 52, 325 S.E.2d
677 (1985); Zajac v. Great American Ins. Cos., 410 N.W.2d 155
(N.D. 1987); Caserta v. Allstate Ins. Co., 14 Ohio App.3d 167, 470
N.E.2d 430 (1983); Seals, Inc. v. Tioga County Grange Mutual Ins.
Co., 359 Pa.Super. 606, 519 A.2d 951 (1986); Rutledge v. St. Paul
Fire & Marine Ins. Co., 286 S.C. 360, 334 S.E.2d 131 (1985);
Raphtis v. St. Paul Fire & Marine Ins. Co., S.D. 491, 198 N.W.2d
505 (1972); Texas General Indemnity Co. v. Speakman, 736 S.W.2d
874 (Tex. Civ. App. 1987); Huff v. State Farm Fire & Casualty Ins.
Co., 716 S.W.2d 927 (Tenn. App. 1986); Great American Ins. Co.
v. K & W Log, Inc., 22 Wash. App. 468, 591 P.2d 457 (1979);
Hayseeds, Inc. v. State Farm Fire & Casualty, 352 S.E.2d 73 (W. Va.
App. 1986). Three jurisdictions have applied the clear and convincing
evidence standard: Schultz v. Republic Ins. Co., 124 111.App.3d 342,
464 N.E.2d 767 (1984); Hutt v. Lumbermens Mutual Casualty Co.,
95 App.Div.2d 255, 466 N.Y.S.2d 28 (1983); Northwestern National
Ins. Co. v. Nemetz, 135 Wis.2d 245, 400 N.W.2d 33 (1986).

C :\ WP51 \HORRELL\ 101227. BR

20

Verrastro v. Middlesex Ins. Co., 540 A.2d 693, 695-96, n.2 (Conn. 1988).5 A
survey of current cases reveals that twenty-nine jurisdictions find that incendiarism
must be proven by a preponderance of the evidence, whereas only three find that
the defense must be proven by clear and convincing evidence. The leading treatise
has also concluded:
As a matter of law, a defense of incendiarism is not sustained unless
the evidence creates a reasonable inference of [the] insured's guilt.
Evidence does not need to be clear and convincing but rather the
insurer must prove its defense by the preponderance of the evidence.
18 George J. Couch, Cyclopedia of Insurance Law § 74:667 (1983).
The Horrells can find only four cases to support their contention that the
incendiarism defense should be proven by clear and convincing evidence.
Carpenter v. Union Ins. Soc, 284 F.2d 155 (4th Cir. 1960); Mize v. Hartford Ins.
Co., 567 F.Supp. 550 (W.D. Va. 1982); McGory v. Allstate Ins. Co., 527 So. 2d

5

The Verrastro court found only three jurisdictions that applied a clear and
convincing standard: New York, Wisconsin and Illinois. Since Verrastro,
Illinois has adopted the preponderance standard. Fittje v. Calhoun County Mut.
County Fire Ins. Co., 552 N.E. 2d 353 (111. Ct. App. 1990). Mississippi
adopted a clear and convincing standard. McGory v. Allstate Ins. Co., 527 So.
2d 632 (Miss. 1988). Three other states (in addition to Connecticut in Verrastro) have since adopted the preponderance standard. Dairy Queen of Fairbanks, Inc., v. Travelers Indemnity Co. of America, 748 P.2d 1169 (Alaska
1988); Pacheco v. Safeco Ins. Co. of America, 780 P.2d 116 (Idaho 1989);
Bateman v. State Farm Fire & Casualty Co., 814 S.W.2d 684 (Mo. Ct. App.
1991). Iowa adopted the preponderance standard in 1944 and Oklahoma in
1969. Koontz v. Farmers Mut. Ins. Ass'n of Van Buren County, 16 N.W.2d 20
(Iowa 1944); Pacific Ins. Co. v. Frank, 452 P.2d 794 (Okla. 1969).
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632 (Miss. 1988); Hutt v. Lumberman's Mut. Cas. Co., 466 N.Y.S.2d 28 (N.Y.
App. 1983).
However, the Fourth Circuit's ruling in Carpenter (applying South Carolina
law), has been implicitly overruled by the South Carolina Court of Appeals.
Rutledge v. St. Paul Fire & Marine Ins. Co., 334 S.E.2d 131 (S.C. Ct.App.
1985). Thus, only three cases cited by the Horrells have continuing force.6

B.

PUBLIC POLICY SUPPORTS THE APPLICATION OF THE
PREPONDERANCE OF THE EVIDENCE STANDARD.

Those courts requiring that the incendiarism defense be proven by "clear and
convincing" evidence rationalize that the incendiarism and misrepresentation
exclusions in the policy are "like fraud." McGory v. Allstate Ins. Co., 527 So.2d
632, 635 (Miss. 1988). Another Court has held that because incendiarism is also
a crime, a higher standard should apply. Mize v. Hartford Ins. Co., 567 F.Supp.
550, 552 (W.D.Va. 1982). These contentions have been rejected by the better
reasoned cases from this and other jurisdictions.

6

There is an issue as to whether the McGory decision would require the
insurer to prove its defense under the "concealment" clause, also at issue here,
by clear and convincing evidence. Hall v. State Farm Fire & Cas. Co., 937
F.2d 210 (5th Cir. 1991)(the elements of "concealment" differ from those of
fraud and need only be proven by a prepondernce of the evidence.)
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1.

THE INCENDIARISM AND MISREPRESENTATION
DEFENSES ARE CONTRACTUAL AND SHOULD BE
ESTABLISHED BY A PREPONDERANCE OF THE EVIDENCE,

The better-reasoned cases teach that the preponderance of the evidence
standard should apply because incendiarism and misrepresentation are contractual
defenses under the policy. The Utah Supreme Court has long held that an
exclusion is an affirmative defense which need be proven only by a preponderance
of the evidence. Whitlock v. Old American Ins. Co., 21 Utah 2d 131, 442 P.2d 26,
27 (Utah 1968) (see Section C, infra).
The New Jersey Court of Appeals has concluded that because these defenses
are contractual in nature, the preponderance standard should apply:
Defendant does not assert that upon procuring the policy plaintiff
intended to commit arson. Rather, defendant is claiming that
plaintiff, through its principal managing agent Fish, deliberately and
willfully set the fire. This case is not one of equitable fraud. It
involves the affirmative defenses of arson and fraud and false
swearing which, if proven, establish a violation of the standard
provisions of the fire insurance policy ... and relieve defendant from
any responsibility for plaintiff's fire loss. Where, as here, the
plaintiff—insured has intentionally set fire to the property covered by
the policy of insurance, sound principles of public policy preclude
recovery.
Italian Fisherman, Inc. v. Commercial UnionAssur. Co., 521 A.2d 912, 913 (NJ.
Ct. App. 1987). The Kansas Supreme Court has likewise held that the incendiarism or misrepresentation defenses are contractual and do not state a claim for fraud:
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The company is not claiming that the insurance contract is void
because, at the time it was obtained, the insureds had the intent to
commit arson and collect under the policy. Rather, it claims that the
Neises committed an unlawful act, arson, or procured its commission,
which is a simple breach of contract. Strong principles of public
policy deny the insured the right to recover when he intentionally sets
on fire property covered by the insurance contract.
Neises v. Solomon State Bank, 696 P.2d 372, 378 (Kan. 1985). The Idaho
Supreme Court has also held that the incendiarism and misrepresentation defenses
are contractual in nature:
The case was actually tried on a breach of contract theory, and breach
of contract is proven by a preponderance of the evidence, not by clear
and convincing evidence. The terms of the policy stated that the
insurance company would not pay if someone burned his own
property; the policy language clearly includes the defenses of
dishonest and criminal acts in addition to the defense of fraud.
Finally, public policy would not allow recovery under a contract of
insurance where the insured started his own fire.
Pacheco v. Safeco Ins. Co. of Am., 780 P.2d 116, 123-23 (Idaho 1989). Finally,
the Connecticut Supreme Court has held as follows:
Finally, we note that in the case of an insurance contract, the
consequence of the alleged concealment or misrepresentation is the
forfeiture of a contractual benefit, and therefore the burden of proof
normally applicable to contractual claims, the preponderance of the
evidence standard, should control. . . . We therefore disagree with
the plaintiffs contention that common law fraud and an insurer's
defense of concealment or misrepresentation are sufficiently similar
to warrant applying an elevated burden of proof to the latter.
Rego v. Connecticut Ins. Placement Fac, 593 A.2d 491, 495 (Conn. 1991).
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In this case, the Horrells sued Utah Farm Bureau for breach of contract
alleging that it had an obligation to provide benefits for a covered occurrence.
Utah Farm Bureau raised as affirmative defenses the fact that the Horrells' fire
was not a covered loss because the policy provisions did not cover intentional acts
(such as incendiarism) and losses where the insured made misrepresentations in
relation to the claim. Utah Farm Bureau did not counterclaim against Mr. Horrell
and allege all nine elements of common law fraud. The entire action was tried as
a "breach of contract" action, and indeed the Horrells did not even allege noncontract claims.
To hold that incendiarism must be proven by clear and convincing evidence
would impose an unfair burden upon one party to the contract. Such a rule would
allow the Horrells to prove a breach of one provision of the agreement by a mere
preponderance of the evidence, while requiring Utah Farm Bureau to prove the
application of another provision of the same contract by a much higher burden.
The Horrells' attempts to transform Utah Farm Bureau's contractual defenses into
a "fraud" action should be rejected, and the trial court's order granting a new trial
should be affirmed.
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2.

THE INCENDIARISM AND MISREPRESENTATION DEFENSES ARE NOT COMPARABLE TO
FRAUD.

Many courts adopting the preponderance standard do so because the
elements of the incendiarism or misrepresentation defense do not mirror fraud. For
example, in Rego v. Connecticut Ins. Placement Fac, 593 A.2d 491, 495 (Conn.
1991), the Supreme Court of Connecticut rejected the plaintiffs argument that the
misrepresentation exclusion was "like fraud":
Our conclusion is supported by the distinction between the
elements of common law fraud and the elements of an insurer's
defense of concealment or misrepresentation. An insurer who raises
this special defense must prove only that the insured wilfully
concealed or misrepresented a material fact with the intention of
deceiving the insurer. Chauser v. Niagara Fire Ins. Co., 123 Conn.
413, 423, 196 A. 137 (1937). Unlike a party asserting a cause of
action for common law fraud, an insurer who raises the special
defense of concealment or misrepresentation does not have to prove
that the insurer actually relied on the concealment or misrepresentation or that the insurer suffered injury.
Id.

Similarly, in St. Paul Mercury Ins. Co. v. Salovich, 705 P.2d 812, 815

(Wash. App. 1985), the Washington Court of Appeals held:
However, courts from other jurisdictions have distinguished between
cases involving misrepresentations to induce the execution of the
contract, in which fraud must be established, and cases involving
misrepresentations in a claim for coverage under the contract, in
which fraud need not be established. While direct proof of misrepresentation by the insured in an insurance claim is seldom available, and
the insurer often has no choice but to rely on the words of the insured
in ascertaining the facts involved in the loss, the insurer need not
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establish reliance, an essential element of fraud, in order to deny
coverage for such misrepresentation.
Id. at 814-15.
Here, the Utah Farm Bureau policy provided as follows:
Concealment of Fraud. The entire policy will be void if, whether
before or after a loss, an insured has:
a.
intentionally concealed or misrepresented any material
fact or circumstance;
b.
engaged in any fraudulent conduct; or
c.
made false statements.
R. 21. Utah Farm Bureau alleged that Mr. Horrell "has intentionally made
misrepresentations of material fact relating to his loss" by denying that he
intentionally set the fire. R. 21. Utah Farm Bureau did not raise as an affirmative
defense that Mr. Horrell "engaged in any fraudulent conduct."
In order to state a claim for fraud in Utah, a party must prove nine
elements:
(1) that a misrepresentation was made (2) concerning a presently
existing material fact (3) which was false and (4) which the representor either (a) knew to be false or (b) made recklessly, knowing that
there was insufficient knowledge upon which to base such a representation, (5) for the purpose of inducing the other party to act upon it
and (6) that the other party, acting reasonably and in ignorance of its
falsity, (7) did in fact rely upon it (8) and was thereby induced to act
(9) to that party's injury or damage.
Educators Mut. Ins. Assoc, v. Allied Prop. & Cas. Ins. Co., 890 P.2d 1029, 1032
(Utah 1995).
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As in the cases from other jurisdictions cited above, Utah Farm Bureau was
not required to prove elements (5)-(9) in order to prove its affirmative defense
under the policy. Utah Farm Bureau need only prove that a misrepresentation of
a material fact was made. Thus, the Horrells' claim that this action is "like fraud"
fails and the trial court's order granting a new trial should be affirmed.
The incendiarism exclusion under the policy is even less analogous to a
fraud action. Utah Farm Bureau need not prove that any material misrepresentation was made, nor must it prove that Mr. Horrell intended to deceive Utah Farm
Bureau or that it relied upon the misrepresentations. In fact, Utah Farm Bureau
need not prove a single element of the "fraud" claim to state an incendiarism
defense.
The Horrells' contention that the incendiarism and misrepresentation
defenses are "like fraud" has been rejected by the overwhelming majority of courts
because there is no relation between the common law fraud action and the breach
of contract due to incendiarism or misrepresentation defense. The trial court's
order granting Utah Farm Bureau's motion for new trial should be affirmed.

3,

THE CRIMINAL NATURE OF ARSON SHOULD
NOT ALTER THE CIVIL BURDEN OF PROOF.

As set forth above, one court has ruled that the incendiarism and misrepresentation defenses must be proven by "clear and convincing evidence" because
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arson is also a crime. McGory v. Allstate Ins. Co., 527 So.2d 632, 635 (Miss.
1988). However, the Horrells have presented no authority from the Utah Supreme
Court requiring that criminal acts be proven by clear and convincing evidence in
civil cases.
On the contrary, the Utah Supreme Court has held that where a defendant
alleges a crime as an affirmative defense in a civil action, the preponderance of the
evidence standard applies. Auto West, Inc. v. Baggs, 678 P.2d 286 (Utah 1984).
In Baggs, the defendant counterclaimed against the plaintiffs alleging slander.
Specifically, the defendant alleged that the plaintiffs had told third parties that he
had "embezzled" or "stolen" from the company.

The plaintiffs defended the

counterclaim based upon the truth of the statements. The Utah Supreme Court held
that the plaintiffs need only prove the truth of their embezzlement claim by a
preponderance of the evidence:
We adopt the general rule that where a crime is imputed to a plaintiff
and a defendant pleads truth as a defense, he need not prove the truth
of the assertion "beyond a reasonable doubt, and a preponderance of
evidence is sufficient to bar recovery."
Id. at 291.
Certainly, the Horrells would agree that an accusation of embezzlement
carries a stigma equal to that of fraud.7 Nevertheless, the Utah Supreme Court
7

Indeed, the Mississippi Supreme Court equated the two charges.
McGory, 527 So.2d at 635.
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allowed the defense to prove the stigmatizing crime of "embezzlement" in a civil
action by a mere preponderance of the evidence. There is no reason why Utah
Farm Bureau, notwithstanding the alleged stigma, should be held to a higher
burden when proving that Mr. Horrell breached the "intentional act" exclusion of
the policy.
The Horrells present no Utah authority to support their contention that
criminal acts must be proven by a higher quantum of evidence in civil cases.
Indeed, much of tort law is merely an extension of the criminal code. For
example, the tort concept of "wrongful death" is similar to "negligent homicide."
UTAH CODE ANN.

§ 76-5-206 (1995). The civil action for "assault and battery"

mirrors the crime of "assault." UTAH CODE ANN. § 76-5-102 (1995). Indeed, even
driving infractions such as "speeding," "following too closely," and "failing to
signal," have criminal consequences. UTAH CODE ANN. § 41-6-1 et seq. (1994).
Yet neither this Court nor the Utah Supreme Court has ever required that these tort
actions be proven by clear and convincing evidence simply because the elements
are analogous to a crime.
Indeed, each of these civil actions requires only a preponderance of the
evidence for that very reason - each is a civil action and no criminal sanctions are
sought. Similarly, the Utah Supreme Court has never required more than a
preponderance standard in breach of contract actions. Whitlock v. Old American
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Ins. Co., 21 Utah 2d 131, 442 P.2d 26, 27 (Utah 1968). Utah Farm Bureau can
perceive no basis for allowing the Horrells to pursue their breach of contract claim
using traditional contract standards, while requiring Utah Farm Bureau to pursue
its breach of contract claims under criminal or fraud standards. There is no Utah
authority for such an imbalance in the burdens of proof, and the Horrells argument
should be rejected.
4.

THE NATURE OF THE INCENDIARISM DEFENSE
WARRANTS A PREPONDERANCE OF THE EVIDENCE
STANDARD.

Many courts have accurately noted that incendiarism is difficult to prove
because there are rarely eye-witnesses to the "striking of the match." Great
American Ins. Co. v. K & WLog, Inc., 591 P.2d 457 (Wash. Ct. App. 1979);
Christensen v. State Farm Mut. Auto. Ins. Co., 552 So. 2d 1377 (La. Ct. App.
1989). For example, in Great American Ins. Co., the Washington Court of
Appeals stated:
Arson is an offense which is most often proved by circumstantial
evidence. It is one of those crimes which is peculiarly of secret
preparation and commission; and it is seldom that the prosecution can
furnish testimony of an eye witness who observed the setting of the
fire.

Great American Ins. Co., 591 P.2d at 460. The Louisiana Court of Appeals has
also stated:
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At this point, we recognize a distinct observation from our jurisprudential experience, that the very act of arson necessitates an environment where there are no witnesses and little direct evidence
pointing towards the responsible party.
Christens en, 552 So. 2d at 1379.
The Utah Supreme Court has also recognized the difficulty in proving
criminal arson:
In viewing the case in light of the totality of the evidence, the offense
may be established by circumstantial evidence. Such evidence may be
the only way of establishing a case of arson, which usually is based
on secret preparation and activity.
State v. Dronzack, 671 P.2d 199, 200 (Utah 1983).
For this reason, the majority of courts have held that an insurer meets its
burden of proof by setting forth sufficient circumstantial evidence to establish each
of the following elements:
(1) the incendiary nature of the fire;
(2) that the insureds had a motive for setting the fire, and
(3) surrounding circumstantial evidence implicating the appellants in
setting the fire or causing it to be set.
Emasco Ins, Co. v. Waymire, 788 P.2d 1357, 1360 (Mont. 1990). See, also, State
Farm Lloyds, Inc. v. Polasek, 847 S.W.2d 279, 282 (Tex. Ct. App. 1992);
McReynolds v. Cherokee Ins. Co., 815 P.2d 208, 211 (Tenn App. 1991); Moore
v. Farmer's Ins. Exch., 444 N.E.2d 220 (111. Ct. App. 1982).
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To impose a higher evidentiary burden upon insurers already required to
prove a claim with largely circumstantial evidence would essentially eliminate the
incendiarism defense altogether because the insurer would be required to present
direct evidence that the insured lit the fire, evidence which the careful arsonist
would not provide.
The Horrells contend that to allow the incendiarism defense to be proven
applying the same standard as in all other civil cases would essentially require
them to prove that they did not set the fire. However, they do not present any
basis for this conclusion. The insurer already has the heavy burden of presenting
sufficient circumstantial evidence that the insured set the fire intentionally. This
alone provides sufficient protection for the Horrells.
Moreover, the burden of contradicting the evidence presented by Utah Farm
Bureau is no greater in this case than in any other civil case.

The Horrells

retained the services of their own cause and origin investigator, John Blundell, to
help them disprove that Mr. Horrell set the fire. They called in their case in chief
certain firefighters and neighbors to negate Utah Farm Bureau's theory that Mr.
Horrell set the fire.
Under the preponderance standard, the Horrells would be treated no
differently from any civil plaintiff facing a contention that he or she was
contributorily negligent. In fact, no more would be required of the Horrells to
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defend against Utah Farm Bureau's claim that Mr. Horrell breached the policy
than was expected of Utah Farm Bureau in defending against the Horrells' claims
that it breached the contract.
Utah Farm Bureau was already disadvantaged in this suit because it was
required to prove its claim by circumstantial evidence, whereas the Horrells could
prove their contentions by largely direct evidence from the insurer's claim file. To
magnify this disadvantage when both claims arise out of the same contract would
be manifestly unfair to Utah Farm Bureau.
5.

PUBLIC POLICY CONCERNS MANDATE IMPOSITION
OF THE NORMAL CIVIL STANDARD OF PROOF.

The Horrells freely admit that those committing arson should not benefit
from their acts by recovering insurance. Application of the civil burden of the
preponderance of the evidence is the only manner in which to effectuate this public
policy.
The Supreme Court of Alaska has held that application of the preponderance
of the evidence standard is the only manner in which to advance the public policy
underlying the incendiarism defense:
Perhaps more importantly, these courts recognize that ,f[s]trong
principles of public policy deny the insured the right to recover when
he intentionally sets on fire property covered by his insurance
contract. Neises, 696 P.2d at 378. It would hinder this public policy
to require proof by a higher standard than usual for civil cases.
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Dairy Queen of Fairbanks v. Travelers Indem. Co. of Am., 748 P.2d 1169, 1172
(Alaska 1988).
The Utah Legislature has not hesitated to maintain the normal preponderance
standard when public policy requires. For example, while punitive damages
generally must be proven by clear and convincing evidence, this standard does not
apply to claims that a tort-feasor was driving under the influence of alcohol.

UTAH

CODE ANN. § 78-18-1 (l)(b) (1992).
As set forth above, if the clear and convincing evidence standard were
applied, the insurer would rarely be able to meet its burden. An insured exercising
even the slightest care would be able to recover benefits because there would never
be an eye-witness to the crime and therefore, the insurer would rarely be able to
prove its case such that there was no "substantial doubt" as to who started the fire,
which is necessary under the clear and convincing instruction given in this case.
R. 1082. The only manner in which to effectuate the public policy of denying
arsonists financial gain is to allow the insurer to prove its claims by a preponderance of the evidence.
6.

THE HORRELLS' ARGUMENT THAT ARSON CARRIES
A "STIGMA" SHOULD BE REJECTED.

Stripped to its essence, the Horrells' claim is ultimately that a higher burden
should apply because an allegation of misrepresentation and incendiarism carries
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a "stigma." This is an inadequate basis to impose a higher burden of proof upon
Utah Farm Bureau.
The Horrells' argument largely follows one case. Transamerica Ins. Co. v.
Bloomfield, 637 P.2d 176, 180 (Or. Ct. App. 1981). Like much of the authority
relied upon by the Horrells, Bloomfield has been overruled. Mutual of Enumclaw
Ins. Co. v. McBride, 667 P.2d 494 (Or. 1983). In McBride, the Supreme Court
of Oregon held that the defenses of incendiarism and misrepresentation need only
be proven by a preponderance of the evidence.

When faced with a "stigma"

argument similar to that made by the Horrells, the court responded:
We applied a similar consideration in Fahrenwald v. Hemphill, supra,
where we said that a reason for requiring clear and convincing proof
of fraud is that "[t]he stigma of fraud is not lightly laid upon a
defendant." . . . This was, however, little more than a maxim, and
more analysis is required to establish whether the statutory action for
insurance fraud and false swearing alleged at bar is quasi-criminal or
threatens the individual involved with "a significant depravation of
liberty or stigma."
Here, the consequences of fraud and false swearing is solely the
forfeiture of a contractual benefit.
Mutual of Enumclaw Ins. Co. v. McBride, 667 P.2d 494, 499 (Or. 1983).
In fact, the Supreme Court of Connecticut has noted that:
A majority of the states that have examined the burden of proof in
civil arson cases have adopted the preponderance of the evidence
standard. This rule has been applied in jurisdictions, like Connecticut,
that have adopted the "clear and convincing evidence" standard for
proof of fraud in a civil action.
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Verrastro v. Middlesex Ins. Co., 540 A.2d 693, 695-96 (Conn. 1988). Thus, even
those courts recognizing that fraud imposes a stigma sufficient to warrant a higher
burden of proof have not found the stigma sufficient to impose a greater burden
in breach of contract actions.
Many civil actions impose a "stigma." An assault case implies that the actor
is a "bully." A wrongful death case imposes the stigma of being responsible, either
intentionally or negligently, for taking another life. The Horrells claim that the
defenses asserted by Utah Farm Bureau imply that he is a "cheat." However, do
not the Horrells' contentions that Utah Farm Bureau is denying them insurance
proceeds to which they are allegedly entitled also imply that Utah Farm Bureau is
a "cheat"?

If a civil litigant could raise the burden required of his adversary

simply by contending that the claims cast him in a poor light with his fellow
citizens, clear and convincing evidence would be the rule rather than the
exception. The Horrells' "stigma" argument is nothing more than a veiled attempt
to gain a litigation advantage in this case.
Moreover, it should be noted that the Horrells brought this claim. They have
placed the circumstances of the fire and the performance of the contract into issue.
To allow them to close off a part of this inquiry by contending that a stigma will
result is unfair to the party they are suing. The Horrells' stigma argument should
be rejected and the trial court's order mandating a new trial should be affirmed.
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C.

UTAH FARM BUREAU DOES NOT SEEK TO AVOID THE
CONTRACT AND THUS, A HIGHER STANDARD OF PROOF
SHOULD NOT BE APPLIED.

The Horrells contend that anytime an insurance company asserts an
exclusion in the policy as an affirmative defense, the insurer should be required
to prove that exclusion by clear and convincing evidence because an exclusion is
an "avoidance" of the contract. This assertion is contrary to Utah law and the
public policy underlying the "avoidance" decisions.
The Utah Supreme Court has already held that where an insurer invokes an
exclusion in the policy to deny coverage, the insurer need only prove its defense
by a preponderance of the evidence:
In that connection it is well to have in mind the burden of proof as to
the problem here presented: Where a loss occurs which normally
would be compensable under an insurance policy, and the company
asserts a defense of non-coverage on the ground of an exception in the
policy, the general rule of insurance law is that this is in the nature
of an affirmative defense; and that the company has the burden of
proving by a preponderance of the evidence that the loss comes within
the exception stated in the policy.
Whitlock v. Old American Ins. Co., 21 Utah 2d 131, 442 P.2d 26, 27 (Utah 1968).
Thus, even if Utah Farm Bureau's defense can be called one of "avoidance," the
Utah Supreme Court has already held that the preponderance of the evidence
standard should apply.
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In addition, the public policy underlying the "avoidance" cases cited by the
Horrells is not applicable to this case. In Peterson v. Peterson, 571 P.2d 1360,
1362 (Utah 1977), the Utah Supreme Court identified the types of cases to which
the clear and convincing standard applies:
Among the classes of cases to which this special standard of persuasion (clear and convincing proof) has been applied are the
following: (1) charges of fraud, and undue influence, (2) suits on oral
contracts to make a will, and suits to establish the terms of a lost will,
(3) suits for the specific performance of an oral contract, (4) proceedings to set aside, reform, or modify written transactions or official
acts on the grounds of fraud, mistake, or incompleteness, and (5)
miscellaneous types of claims and defenses, varying from state to
state, where there is thought to be special danger of deception, or
where the court considers that the particular type of claim should be
disfavored on policy grounds.
Id. In Peterson, the Supreme Court held that a defendant holding a joint account
with his wife must prove that the funds are not his by "clear and convincing
evidence" because there is a "special danger of deception." Id. at 1362.
Each of these cases involves a situation where it is "one person's word
against another." The Court held that in these cases, the person asserting the claim
and seeking to avoid a valid contract must set forth clear and convincing evidence
and cannot rely solely upon his own testimony or evidence which he controls and
which is not subject to proof.
There is no "special danger" of deception in an incendiarism case. The case
is not proven based solely upon the testimony of one witness, but rather is based
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almost entirely upon the physical evidence. Utah Farm Bureau does not have sole
control over the evidence. On the contrary, all of the evidence in this case was in
the sole possession of the Horrells. This case is not unlike any other civil tort
case, where evidence is adduced from the other party. The cases cited by the
Horrells alleging "avoidance" are simply not applicable here. On the contrary, the
Utah Supreme Court has already held that an exclusion in an insurance policy need
only be proven by a preponderance of the evidence.
In sum, the overwhelming weight of authority and the compelling public
policy arguments support allowing an insurer to prove that the insured breached
the contract by a preponderance of the evidence. For this reason, the trial court's
order granting a new trial should be affirmed.
II.

THE TRIAL COURT DID NOT ERR IN CONCLUDING THAT
THE ERROR REGARDING THE BURDEN OF PROOF WAS
HARMFUL.
A.

THIS COURT SHOULD NOT REVERSE THE TRIAL COURT
ABSENT AN ABUSE OF DISCRETION.

The trial court ordered a new trial on the grounds that Utah Farm Bureau
was erroneously required to show incendiarism by clear and convincing evidence
rather than a preponderance of the evidence. In doing so, the Court implicitly
found that its error was harmful and warranted a new trial. This Court has very
recently held:
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We will not reverse a trial court's decision to grant or deny a motion
for new trial absent an abuse of discretion.
Rasmussen v. Sharapata, 895 P.2d 391, 396 (Utah Ct. App. 1995). The Utah
Supreme Court long ago stated the purpose for vesting broad discretion in the trial
court:
Due to the considerations set forth above, and the advantaged position
the trial court occupies with respect to the trial, the prior decisions of
this court have been uniformly to the effect that the trial court has a
broad discretion in ruling on motions for a new trial and that his
action will not be disturbed in the absence of a plain abuse thereof.
Holmes v. Nelson, 326 P.2d 722, 726 (Utah 1958). In this case, the trial judge,
who had the opportunity to see and hear the witnesses, is far better equipped to
determine whether there was a substantial likelihood of a different outcome if the
proper burden were imposed. This Court should not overturn the trial court's
determination absent a showing that the court abused its discretion. The Horrells
have ignored their burden of showing the trial court abused its discretion.
B.

THE TRIAL COURT DID NOT ERR IN DETERMINING THAT
THE ORIGINAL ERROR WAS HARMFUL.

The Horrells' only argument with respect to harmless error is that a
comparison of the jury's response to separate special verdict questions regarding
different claims proves that the jury believed Greg Horrell did not intentionally set
fire to his own home. However, this argument fails because the jury was asked
to determine separate issues based upon the evidence existing at different times.
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Initially, the jury was asked to determine whether Mr. Horrell set the fire.
Question 1 of the special verdict inquired:
1.

Do you find by clear and convincing evidence that Gregory
Horrell intentionally set the fire which occurred at his residence
on October 3, 1990?

(R. 1122, attached as Exhibit "G"). The jury was allowed to consider all of the
evidence adduced during trial, regardless of whether the evidence was discovered
before or after the claim was denied by Utah Farm Bureau.
However, when considering whether the claim was "fairly debatable," the
jury was allowed to consider only that evidence in the possession of Utah Farm
Bureau at the time it denied the Horrells' claim. The jury was asked:
6.

Do you find by a preponderance of the evidence that the Horrell's claim was "fairly debatable" as that term has been defined
in the instructions?

(R. 1123, attached as Exhibit "G"). "Fairly debatable" was defined in the
instructions as follows:
"Fairly debatable" means that the laws or facts which support the
insurer's position create a reasonable likelihood that the denial of the
claim would be upheld in court. In determining whether or not the
insurer's position was fairly debatable and reasonably justified, you
should consider all laws or facts upon which a reasonable insurance
company would rely in deciding whether to pay a claim. This would
include the laws or facts supporting the insured's position that were
either known, or that should have been known, by the insurer.
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(R. 1097, attached as Exhibit "H"). In reaching its decision regarding Question
6, the jury was limited to the evidence at the time the claim was denied* Thus,
an evaluation of the Horrells' argument demonstrates that they are seeking to
"compare apples and oranges."
After the claim was denied in March, 1992, the Horrells brought this
lawsuit. During discovery in this suit, substantial additional evidence was gained
showing that Mr. Horrell set the fires to his home, including:
1.
At the time of Mr. Robert Jacobsen's report in February, 1991, law
enforcement officials such as Randy Jacobson of the South Salt Lake Fire
Department refused to discuss the matter because of the on-going criminal
investigation. (See Report of Robert Jacobsen, attached as Exhibit "A").
However, at the time of trial, Mr. Randy Jacobson testified that in his
opinion, the fire was incendiary and Mr. Horrell set the fire. R. 2725-2729.
2.
At the time of Mr. Jake Jacobsen's cause and origin report, the
assumption was that the second fire was a "rekindle" of the first fire. This
was based upon the fact that Mr. Horrell stated in his statement that he was
given a ride by a Red Cross volunteer to his mother-in-law's home shortly
after first fire. Mr. Horrell even produced the volunteer's business card to
positively identify this individual. R. 2948. However, at trial, the Red Cross
volunteer denied ever giving Mr. Horrell a ride. R. 2848-49.

8

Although not necessary for its ruling, the trial court stated as follows
in granting the new trial:
THE COURT: The Court is persuaded that there is substantial
evidence that the claims were fairly debatable. I make no finding
thereon, but simply make the observation.
(Ruling, attached as Exhibit "I").
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3.
In addition, at the time of Mr. Jake Jacobsen's report, he relied upon
Mr. Don C. Herbert's statement that he saw power lines arcing shortly
before the second fire began. R. 1842. However, during discovery in this
lawsuit, Mr. Kenneth R. Rigby, an employee of Utah Power, testified that
he was called shortly after the first fire a that he knows "for a fact I cut the
power." R. 2172. Mr. Norman Tateoka, an other employee of Utah Power,
testified that when he arrived on the morning after the second fire to turn off
the power, it was already off.9
4.
In his statement to Mr. Jake Jacobsen, Mr. Horrell indicated that
while he maintained insurance on his vehicles, he did not maintain insurance
on his boats. (See Report of Robert Jacobsen, attached as Exhibit "A").
During discovery in this litigation, Mr. Horrell conceded that he had not
maintained insurance on his vehicles, his business, or any property other
than the home. R. 1593.10
5.
In 1986, Mr. Horrell's mother, Shirley Horrell, sent Greg Horrell a
check in the amount of $40,000 made payable to the mortgagee, Arlene
Beckstrom, for full payment of the home. R. 2926. Ms. Beckstrom testified
that she received only a portion of those funds. R. 2317.11
6.
Mr. Horrell reported receiving $2,400 rental income from a home in
Alaska in 1989, but failed to report this income to the Internal Revenue
Service on his 1989 income tax return. R. 1585-1586.

9

In conjunction with Mr. Horrell's false statement regarding the Red Cross
volunteer, these facts show that Mr. Horrell had an opportunity to set the
second fire. Moreover, Mr. Rigby's testimony eliminates the possibility that
the second fire was caused by electrical failure.
10

The implication of such testimony is that Mr. Horrell may have chosen to
destroy the home because it was the only property from which he could obtain
insurance benefits.
11

The implication of such testimony is that Mr. Horrell could not obtain
help from his mother in order to avoid the 1990 mortgage foreclosure because
she assumed that the loan had been paid.
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7.
Mr. Horrell claimed in his Examination under Oath before the claim
was denied that his income tax returns were destroyed in the fire, but at trial
he admitted that he did not even prepare income tax returns for the years
1984-1989 until February, 1991, three months after the fire and that he had
copies of the returns he could have given to Farm Bureau but assumed for
no particular reason that Farm Bureau only wanted certified copies. R.
1591-1592.
8.
Although Utah Farm Bureau was aware that Mr. Horrell had problems
with creditors prior to the fire, it was not revealed until discovery in this
action that Mr. Horrell had not made any payments to Utah Power & Light
since June 25, 1990. R. 2944.
When considering whether the claim was fairly debatable, the jury could
consider only that evidence in the possession of Utah Farm Bureau, which
excluded the above evidence. In determining whether Mr. Horrell set the fire, the
jury could consider both the evidence known to Utah Farm Bureau plus the above
evidence.
In other words, it is entirely possible for the jury to conclude by a
preponderance of the evidence that the claim was not fairly debatable when
considering only the evidence in Utah Farm Bureau's possession, but also conclude
by a preponderance of the evidence that Mr. Horrell set the fire based upon all of
the evidence. To equate the two findings, as the Horrells argue should be done,
would necessarily require this Court to hold, as a matter of law, that the
information learned after Utah farm Bureau denied the claim is of no value. There
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is no basis for such a result because the evidence learned after the denial is
certainly relevant to the issue of whether Mr. Horrell set the fire.
The Horrells will characteristically argue that there are plausible explanations for each of the above facts, and they will undoubtedly argue that other
witnesses negate the importance of these assertions.

However, as the Utah

Supreme Court has correctly found: "The jury, not the appellate court, should
weigh the evidence and assess witness credibility." State v. Brown, 853 P.2d 851,
860 (Utah 1992). In this case, it is for the jury to decide how much importance to
attach to each of the above facts.
The Horrells' argument should be rejected because it erroneously assumes
that the jury was considering the same body of evidence when responding to each
inquiry on the special verdict. The trial court did not abuse its discretion in
ordering a new trial based upon harmful error.
CONCLUSION
Based upon the foregoing, Utah Farm Bureau respectfully requests that the
trial court's ruling granting a new trial be affirmed.
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PRIVILEGED/CONFIDENTIAL REPORT
PRELIMINARY REPORT

Utah Farm Bureau
5300 South 360 West, #210
Murray, Utah 84123
ATTN:

Jerry Schaft

INSURED:

Greg Horrell

DATE OP LOSS:

10/3/90

LOSS DESCRIPTION:

Single family dwelling

LOSS LOCATION:

2770 South Main (rear)
Salt Lake City, Utah 84115

POLICY/CLAIM #:

5193692

EVIDENCE LOCATION:

Evidence lock-up of this office

BPA PILE #:

90-1170 SL

OCCUPANT/OWNER:

Same

CAUSE AND ORIGIN:

Arson or incendiary fire that occurred in
utility room of first level through the
use of a suspected flammable liquid. A
subsequent second fire occurred in the
approximate same area of origin shortly
after extinguishment which is also
suspected to be incendiary in nature.

This report is confidential and the exclusive privileged property
of the addressee. Dissemination of this report or any content of
the same to anyone is the sole responsibility of the addressee.

Special Investigations and Consultants
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PRIVILEGED AND CONFIDENTIAL
Preliminary Report
Utah Farm Bureau
5300 South 350 West, #210
Murray, Utah 84123

RE INSURED:
DATE OF LOSS:
POLICY #:
OUR FILE:

Greg Horrell
10/03/90
5192692
90-1170 SL

Attn: Jerry Schaft
February 4, 1991

-1-

90-1170 SL
ASSIGNMENT:

This case assignment was received on October 8, 1990 through a
telephone conversation with Jerry Schaft, Supervisor for Utah Farm
Bureau Insurance.

The concern of this assignment was to conduct an

origin and cause investigation of a fire that occurred on October 3,
1990 in the home of the insured, Greg Horrell.

This fire was one of

many bizarre circumstances that occurred at the time of the fire and
information of those will be provided by law enforcement personnel at
some point during the investigation, as they had not concluded their
preliminary investigation at the time of this assignment.

RISK:
The

fire

of

approximately

concern
1,800

occurred
square

in

feet

two-story structure that was 2 x 4

a

single

family

of

living

space.

residence of
This

was

framed with a pitched roof.

a

Many

remodeling projects had occurred to this residence since its time of
construction.

Those projects have not been defined at this point of

the investigation.

It is suspected, however, that this house is

90—1170 SL
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approximately 45 years old.

Exterior surfaces of the roof were of asphalt shingles throughout.
There was also a multi-paneled solar heating system located on the
southwest surface of the roof.

The inner walls and ceilings were

both sheetrock and lath and plaster, and even portions of missing
ceiling

coverings

which

gave

the

appearance

of

an

unfinished

remodeling project.

There was a heating system located in the crawl space below the main
floor which was not inspected due to the extreme amount of water in
the crawl space. Attempts to inspect this were impossible as this
unit was submerged at the time of the investigation.

However, a

solar heating system supplemented the forced air heating unit in the
partial basement. This was a natural gas forced air heater, unknown
manufacturer model or serial number.
were painted and wallpapered.

The inner surfaces of the walls

There was carpeting on most of the

floors throughout the residence.

Electrical service was an overhead

supply attached on the north

center portion of the residence through a weather head and meter base
mounted

at that point.

Main breaker panel was mounted directly

through the wall interiorly in a utility room which also contained a
washer and dryer, as well as some storage.
to

the partial

basement

was

found.

Within this room, access

Also

found

outside

at the

northeast corner was the natural gas service meter.

INVESTIGATION:
Due to the fact the fire department had not released the fire scene
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and an on-going investigation was being conducted, this office made
contact with South Salt Lake Fire Department to provide a clearance
to conduct a fire scene investigation.

At that time, it was made

known to this office that Randy Jacobson represented South Salt Lake
Fire Department in the investigation conducted by that jurisdiction.
Mr, Jacobson stated that the scene had been released at this point
and it was clear to conduct an investigation.

The insured was also

called and agreed to meet this office the following day to provide
access

to the

residence

as well

as

information

about the fire

incident.

The preliminary scene investigation was conducted on October 9, 1990
at which time the external and internal portions of the residence
were photographed through the use of an Olympus 0M1 35mm SLR camera
using 24mm wide angle lens and 50mm lenses.

Where necessary, flash

photography was provided through a Vivitar 283 flash attachment.
Kodacolor Gold

100 film was used

in the photographing process.

Copies of photographs taken during this investigation accompany this
report.

This

office

arrived

early

on

the

morning

of

the

day

of

the

investigation to find that no one had reported to the residence at
that time.

Therefore, an interview was conducted with Mrs. Meyer who

lived in the house adjacent to the property to the west.

Mrs. Meyer

was one of the first individuals to notice the fire and provided an
recorded

interview

concerning

surrounding this fire incident.
met with

the

the

details

and

circumstances

Later during the day, this office

insured, Greg Horrell, who was

discussing details

concerning this fire with the South Salt Lake fire investigator and
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also Detective Diane Hollis of the South Salt Lake Police Department.

It was at this time it was learned that allegedly gunshots had been
fired at the insured prior to the fire incident and in relationship
to the fire.

More information and details about these circumstances

will be discussed later in this report.

Mr. Horrell stated that

prior to the fire, he had been in the shop (business) which is a
building located to the east of the residence and fronts Main Street
with some friends participating in some hobby activities up until the
time of the alleged gunshots and fire incident.

Mr. Horrell has a

wife and two children who were not home at the time this incident
occurred.

The external inspection was conducted at this time which revealed
severe fire damage to the northeast central and west sections of the
roof and second level.

Many of the windows had been broken out of

the first level and almost all windows and been broken in the upper
level.

The roof had collapsed in the center portion and northeast

sections

of

throughout

the
the

second

level. Severe

residence.

It

was

fire

learned

damage
that

a

had

occurred

rekindle

or

subsequent second fire occurred at approximately 5:36 a.m. on the day
following

the

initial

fire

incident.

The

second

fire occurred

approximately two hours after the fire crews had left the scene from
the initial fire.

Entrance

into the residence was gained through the south center

portion of the residence known as the den or "yellow room" where
heavy fire debris and damage was found throughout this room.

This

provided access to all other areas of the home. It was noticed upon
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the inspection of this room that fire had breached through not only
the

ceiling, but

the

roof

of this room

at

the

north section.

Attached to the den was a utility room where severe fire damage had
occurred both to the inner contents of the room and the roof and
ceiling surfaces. Directly above this area was the piping and supply
of the liquid coolant for the solar system.

It was apparent through

the inspection of these areas that the most fire damage had occurred
at this point. It is unknown whether this had occurred in the first
or second fire.

It was also obvious, through the inspection of the entire residence,
that, a large accumulation of debris had been thrown throughout the
residence subsequent to the fire.

In fact, the den appeared to have

rubble and debris thrown about in a random fashion for purposes
unknown at the time of this investigation.

An appearance of complete

disarray was found in all of the rooms of the residence including the
upper level.

It also appeared that some of the contents of the

residence had been removed prior to the involvement of this office.

The upper floor was inspected to determine burn patterns and the
travel and extension of fire during both fire incidents.

It was

quickly noticed that on the northeast section of the residence, heavy
fire damage had occurred at that level. It gave the impression that
very possibly the first fire may have started in this room.

The

strange configuration of the roof line and the addition of rooms as
well as spaces of the ceiling that had been removed prior to the fire
incident caused concerns with the travel of fire and avenue for
extensions.

Those

configurations

increased burning within this room.

may

have

accounted

for

the

However, that has not been
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confirmed.

Burn patterns of the first fire were confused and changed due to the
second

fire,

but

through

the

interviews

conducted

with

fire

department personnel, it was learned that the initial fire scene was
one which

involved mostly

the heavy

involvement of fire in the

utility room and in the northeast room of the second level.

The

first fire noticed by arriving crews was coming out the north window
of the second level.

There very well could have been two points of origin involving the
first fire. The second fire, very clearly, had involved the utility
room and den of the main level.

It also appeared that fire involved

the child's bedroom situated on the west side of the first level.
Both fires included the involvement of an accelerant in the areas of
origin.

Samples of fire debris and control samples were taken at the

time of this investigation.

Those samples were sent to a lab for

content identification purposes.

During the inspection of the second level, it was noticed that heavy
burning

and

damage

occurred

on the

top

surfaces

of

the floor

joists/trusses in the room on the northeast corner of the house.

A

roll-over effect from the fire also involved severe damage to the
east surface ceiling trusses and subroof which gave the appearance of
an extremely hot, rapidly accelerating fire.
surface

confirmed

alligatoring

on

these

the wooden

accelerated and hot fire.

findings.

The

surfaces

gave

A glazed affect on the
large
the

configuration

appearance

of an

As this office was not involved in the

investigation after the first fire, the type of burning and damage is
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not known.

In talking with fire crews, they indicated that very little fire
damage had occurred to adjacent rooms in the first level.

With the

exception of the utility room and some burning into the den area,
most other rooms were intact and free from any extensive fire damage.
The door to the children's bedroom had been closed and only minor
smoke damage had occurred in this room after the first fire.

Due to the location of the fire which occurred in the utility room,
fire department personnel were concerned with the possibility of the
electrical panel and circuits being involved with the cause of the
fire.

This panel had been removed prior to the involvement of this

office by the fire department and was held in their evidence lock-up
for purposes of analysis.

Subsequent investigations conducted by

this office included the visual inspection of this panel and all
connective circuitry.

It was indicated by the inspection at that

time that no obvious failures or arcing was evident within this
panel.

It did appear that the damage caused to all circuitry,

conductors, and components was from external heat.

The information

provided by the insured stated that the power was off earlier that
day prior to the fire incident.

Information also provided by the

insured stated that there had been no electrical problems with this
service at any time prior to the fire. In fact, a remodeling project
a year or two earlier provided a new panel, breakers, and some of the
electrical circuits throughout the house.

Also on a subsequent investigation, a visit to the residence and
business, this office found a notice of Trustee Sale posted on the
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According to that notice, Associated Title

under Document #3818010 recorded on the 13th day of July, 1983, Book
5474, page 2083, involved the sale of the property which included the
house and business owned by Greg S. and Barbara J. Horrell.
sale was to be conducted

This

on October 29, 1990 at 10:00 for the

purposes of foreclosing on that property and trust deed.

The specific details leading up to that foreclosure are not known at
the time of this investigation, but it did appear through information
provided by other individuals involved that the property and the
payments were in severe arrears which had forced the foreclosure by
Associated Title. It is also known by this office and determined
during the investigation that the property has a second mortgage
agreement

contract

with

Gordon

and

Arlene

Beckstrom.

These

individuals are the original owners of the home, and the purchase
agreement through Mr. Horrell was conducted through the Beckstroms.

The

foreclosure

being

conducted

by

Associated

Title

and

their

position in the property liens is not known at this time of the
investigation.
encumbrances
parties.

The insured denies there being any other liens and

on the property

and

there are no other

interested

He also denies that there have been any other encumbrances

or liens on this property at any other time.

The aforementioned

statements are only a few of many inconsistent statements surfaced
during this investigation.

Enclosed with this report are four transcribed interviews taken of
the insured and the three individuals involved with him on the night
of this incident.

A review of those transcribed statements will
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specific details with regard to matters concerning this

investigation.

However, to provide a synopsis of some of the other

inconsistencies that are within the transcribed interviews, and also
an interview taken on the day of the preliminary investigation with
Mr. Horrell suggest that many items have been reported differently
throughout the investigation.

Besides the conflicting statements made during the investigation,
other items of concern suggest that possible deception or incorrect
reporting of information by the insured has been conducted.

Some of

these items would be the fact that Mr. Horrell indicates that he has
had no problems with any of his vendors, obtaining merchandise or
obtaining credit. During the investigation, several utility bills
were strewn about the debris and rubble within the house that showed
not

only

an

extremely

large

balance

due,

termination of service with lack of payment.

but

indications

of

Additionally, canceled

checks were found for several different checking accounts that Mr.
Horrell does not admit to during the interview.

Of course, of most

concern is the alleged shooting incident that took place on the
evening of the fire incident.

INTERVIEWS:
In addition to the interviews conducted with eye witnesses and other
individuals involved with the fire incident on the evening of its
occurrence, this office talked

to fire department personnel and

neighbors in the area about the fire incident.

Captain Mike Larson of the South Salt Lake Fire Department indicated
that his truck was the first unit arriving on the initial fire
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response at 11:29 p.m.

Captain Larson stated that as they were

leaving the fire station located at approximately 2400 South between
State and Main (approximately three blocks away) , he and his crews
could

see flames showing above the residence indicating a fully

involved fire.

In addition to this, smoke had already reached the

freeway to the north indicating that the fire was heavily involved
and a small wind carried smoke from the south to the north.

He

evidenced, upon arrival, fire coming from the northeast bedroom and
also from the utility room window also on the north side center
portion center of the house.

Their initial attack was gained through the "yellow room" door which
put them directly in line with the utility room for a rapid attack.
Captain Larson stated that the fire was extremely hard to extinguish
and gave the appearance of an accelerated flammable liquid fire. The
fire had already broken through the roof line in the center portion
of the home directly above the utility room and had heavily involved
the adjacent front room and upper levels toward the east of the attic
and the rooms within it.

Captain

Larson

stated

that

once

the

fire

was

extinguished, an

overhaul revealed that very little, if any fire had occurred within
the children's bedroom on the west side of the main level and that
only minimal damage had occurred to the other living room, dining
room, and upstairs bedroom occupying Mr. and Mrs. Horrell's bedding
and clothing.

Captain Larson stated that in addition to the three

engines from South Salt Lake, a back-up and support engines from Salt
Lake County and one from Salt Lake City assisted fire suppression.
Fire crews remained at the scene until approximately 2:43 a.m. the
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next morning in an effort to clean up and make sure all hot spots
were extinguished.

The subsequent fire at 5:36 a.m. was listed as a rekindle by South
Salt Lake Fire Department personnel.

The same areas were involved,

and upon arriving, an advanced and highly accelerated fire was in
progress.

Captain Larson indicated he felt that the fire of this

magnitude was unusual for any type of rekindle.

In spite of the

flammability of the liquid found within the solar panel, Captain
Larson felt that this fire was suspicious and very possibly assisted
with other accelerants in the initial ignition of this fire.

Other law enforcement individuals have talked to this office about
the fire incident. However, due to the fact that the investigation is
on-going and that the fire has been listed as a suspicious fire, no
information will be provided by law enforcement personnel until the
conclusion of their investigation.

Possibly, at this time, results

of lab tests on the electrical components and debris samples taken by
the jurisdiction may be provided.

At this time, this office has no

knowledge of any of those results.

COMMENTS AND CONCLUSIONS:
With the information, details, and evidence gathered at this point of
the

investigation,

determined.

a

preliminary

cause

and

origin

and

been

It is clear with the information obtained during this

investigation that this fire is definitely an incendiary/arson fire
due to the suspicious circumstances surrounding the fire incident.
There is little doubt that this fire and its origin of the initial
fire occurred within the utility room and simultaneously

in the
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Due to the second fire, which

appears also to be incendiary, several of the burn patterns from the
initial fire have been changed and even obliterated due to increased
burning and the accelerated condition of the second fire.

The possibility of a rekindle on the second fire incident cannot be
ruled out.

However, the first fire clearly is an intentionally set

fire.

To identify the specific individual involved with the initial fire,
many factors and much information must be defined to eliminate the
insured and his possible involvement with this incident. One of the
most confusing details in this scenario is, of course, the alleged
shooting

involved with it and its intentions.

As the only eye

witness to this incident is the insured, himself, one must analyze
the details provided during this investigation by him to construct a
relevant story.

It is of concern that the complexion of this incident, when taken at
face value, suggests that the insured was attacked by some unknown
individual
attempted

who
to

not

murder

only
him.

attempted to
From

the

burn his house, but also

information

provided

by the

insured, this is the bottom line definition of the bizarre set of
circumstances involved in this fire incident. Of extreme concern when
trying to analyze and understand this incident, is the acute lack of
any

individual, known or unknown, by the insured or any of his

friends or relatives, that may have intentions to do him in.

There

is no evidence found anywhere in this incident that would suggest
strongly or even remotely anyone who would want to do this to him.
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Upon his own admission, there is no history nor current problems with
anyone that would make these attacks.

Also of significant concern is the lack of any motive for anyone to
do this.

It would suggest that possibly a burglar or vandal entered

the home for those specific reasons.
identified to

However, no evidence has been

indicate this. On the

other hand, when trying to

analyze motive for the fire incident, a strong reflection upon the
insured is suggested through the cursory information already obtained
during this investigation.

It does appear through this evidence that

the insured is having a heavy financial problem and it also appears
that.the family income is insufficient to meet the everyday expenses.
In addition to this, the previously mentioned foreclosure, and also
it's been learned since the fire incident, that the insured has made
application for and filed bankruptcy.
conducted

by this office, he now

However, during the interview
indicates

that this has been

dismissed through the bankruptcy court of Utah.

A laboratory analysis of the fire scene debris was conducted with the
following results. Through the use of Rocky Mountain Instrumental
Laboratories located at 456 South Link Lane, Ft. Collins, Colorado
80524;

telephone

number

(303)

221-3116,

indicated

through

the

laboratory report included in this report that the carpet sample and
control samples taken contained small concentrations of petroleum
distolate

and

moderate

concentrations

of

benzene, tolulene, and

xylene and/or styrene. The debris samples taken of the areas of
origin contained moderate to large concentrations of the same or very
similar mixtures

of aromatics

petroleum distolates.

and

low to high molecular weight

90-1170 SL

-14-

February 4/f 1991

A synopsis of this lab result would indicate that the possibility of
a kerosene product was involved in the fire scene as well as the
components of the solar system.

To isolate the specific chemicals

and determine other flammables in that debris, other tests would have
to be conducted.

However, without any doubt, there was a large

concentration of flammable accelerants within the fire scene and
within the debris and rubble.

Complications are drawn in evaluating these lab results because of
the fact that the large amounts of the flammable liquid within the
solar system confuse or even cover and possibly dilute the types of
flammable liquids used in the initial ignition of this fire.

In

fact, the exact accelerant used to cause this fire may never be
determined because of this fact, and also due to the possibility of
all

of

the components

combustion

phase

of

in that accelerant
both

fires.

being

Therefore,

consumed during

the

validity

and

importance of these tests are left in question at this point of the
investigation.

This office would suggest that, to better

identify or eliminate

individuals indicated in this fire incident, further investigation
must be done.

At this point of the investigation, the insured cannot

be eliminated as having been involved with this fire situation.

This

office would also recommend that a verification of property ownership
and past or present encumbrances be identified.

It would also be of

interest to determine whether, in fact, the mortgages and liens have
been cleared as indicated by Mr. Horrell.
into

the

utility

payment

history

would

A background investigation
also

identify

specific

y\j-±±/v
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financial problems with payment of these utility bills.

Further

research into the known and suspected checking accounts would also
provide additional financial history.

As indicated by individuals and witnesses interviewed, there could be
a possible problem and legal battle with UPS concerning vendors
involved with Mr. Horrell's business.

These facts should also be

investigated to determine their validity.

Additionally, an interview

with Mrs. Horrell concerning the fire incident and details prior to
it may give additional information about why she wasn't home on the
night

of

the

fire.

The

several

vehicles

identified

in this

investigation and their specific owners and previous owners may also
be beneficial.

Of course, a comparison analysis of the statements made by the
insured and transcribed and included with this report would identify
inconsistencies

and

confused

statements

in

both

of

those

transcriptions.

Generally speaking, the general analysis of those

statements would give the appearance of deception by the insured to
specific questions regarding the fire incident. This is also true
about

statements

position.

made

by

the

insured

concerning

his

financial

As the insured has indicated that he will cooperate in

obtaining any information necessary to assist with the investigation,
it may behoove this office to instruct, by letter form, the insured
to obtain all of the utility records, financial records, and other
financial materials of concern prior to and up until the day of the
fire.

Due

to

these

inconsistencies

and

also

due

to

the

bizarre
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circumstances involved with this incident, a clearly defined cause of
this fire incident with respect to who is involved has not been
determined.

Further

questions must
necessity

of

investigation

be conducted
and

the

before

final

and

the

answering

that can

determination

of several

be finalized.
of

the

The

supplemental

assignments will be left up to the decision of the client.

Due to the complexity of this case, it may also be in the best
interest

of

the

client

to

obtain

legal

counsel

in providing

assistance with the course of direction of the investigation.
office

will

assist

wherever

requested

in

any

supplemental work necessary during this investigation.

follow-up

This
or

All evidence

obtained during the preliminary investigation will be held for future
needs as necessary and for as long as requested by the client.

This case assignment is complete with the filing of this preliminary
report pending further requests of the client.

Sincerely,
BURN PATTERN ANALYSIS

RJ,J/mh

r

Enclosures:

Copy of Consent Form for Fire Scene Examination and
Authorization Form from insured
Fire reports from South Salt Lake Fire Department
Laboratory report from Rocky Mountain Instrumental
Laboratories
Copies of newspaper articles from Salt Lake Tribune
61 mounted, 54 loose photographs
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ROCKY MOUNTAIN INSIRUMFNTAL LABORATORIES, INC • 456S. Link Lane. Fort Collins, Colorado80524 • 3C3-22M1I6
LABORATORY

REPORT

Robert Jacobsen
Burn P a t t e r n A n a l y s i s , I n c .
Suite 203
3191 S. V a l l e y S t .
S a l t L a k e C i t y , UT 8 4 1 0 9

S01-4S7-3501

JBJECT:

U t a h Farm B u r e a u 9 0 - 1 1 7 0 - S L

RML 9 0 - 1 4 4 2 - F

vJALYSIS:

GC i d e n t i f i c a t i o n

ETHOD:

H e w l e t t - P a c k a r d 5 S 9 0 g a s c h r o m a t o g r a p h y H-P 3 3 3 3 c o m p u t e r
i n t e g r a t o r , J?;<W DB-5+ q u a r t z c a p i l l a r y c o l u m n 30m x 0.53mm
I D # 9 3 4 5 4 , 3mL/min He, S 0 - 2 4 0 C £ 1 0 C / m i n , 1 IH, 5FH, 200uL KS.

^IDENCE:

R e c e i v e d from J a c o b s e n 3 NOV** 9 0 v i a USPS, s e a l s
s a m p l e s f i r e d e b r i s and o n e c o n t r o l s a m p l e :

-IENT:

Ul:
U2:
U3:
U4:
U3:

of

volatile

Horrall

flammables.

intact,

four

Can f i r e d e b r i s , # 1 Can f i r e d e b r i s ID a s c a r p e t a n d p a d , d o o r w a y , # 2 .
G l a s s s a m p l e s from w i n d o w ,
C a r p e t c o n t r o l . NW c o r n e r c h i l d BRf # 4 .
P l a s t i c c a n ID a s c o n t r o l s a m p l e of l i q u i d , # 5 .

ESULTS:

U3 i s n e g a t i / e f o r / o l a t i l e - " l a m m a b i e s .
U4 ' c a r p e t c o n t r o l . '
c o n t a i n s s m a l l L u n c e n t r a t i o n s o f p e t r o l e u m d i s t i l l a t e and
m o d e r a t e c o n c e n t r a t i o n s of b e n z e n e - t o l u e n e and x y l e n e a n d / o r
styrene.
U i , U2.
and US c o n t a i n m o d e r a t e t o l a r g e
c o n c e n t r a t i o n s of t h e s a m e o r v^ry
s i m i l a r m i x t u r e s of
a r o m a t i c s and low t o h i g h m o l e c u l a r w e i g h t p e t r o l e u m
distillate.
I n c l u d e d i n t h e s e s a m p l e s 3.re b e n z e n e , t o l u e n e ,
, y l e n e s a n d o r s t y r e n e , C9 and C10 a r o m a t i c s , a n d a i k a n e s CS
t h r o u g h a p p r o x i m a t e l y C20.
GC/MS w o u l d a l l o w t h e
d i f f e r e n t i a t i o n of p — x y l e n e , s t y r e n e and n o n a n e *

INCLUSIONS:

U l , U2 r a n d U5 c o n t a i n t h r e - s a m e or very
s i m i l a r mixtuire^oT
v o l a t i l e f l a m m a b l e materrxaJLsGC/MS may a l l o w t h e - d s
;he s a m p l e s -

'J WENDANVS
EXHIBIT
psr.±c±R I

. . S u l i k,

Ph . H .

1 n A r\ 1 *) *i
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WITNESS STATEMENTS TAKEN BY ROBERT JACOBSEN
AND DEPOSITIONS
ROO AI1AKSOK
11/2/90

JACQUFS D'fMAl
U/01/90

DAVE WIGGINS
11/2/W

VACATION TRIP

EXAMINATION UNDER OATH 12/30/91
AND DEPOSITION

VACATION TRIP

VACATION TRIP

j

Satu*-ca\ before fire, Greg said he
was taking famiiv to mountains,
would be bacl Wed about 5:00 p.m.
and aame w?s still on
P21:8-12 OeD
POWER PROBLEMS
known of over 2 vears
P5:48-52
hear about prowler P4.-43
KITE LEAVING
>er saw wife

PS:26-27

said wife up at mother's
P8:26-27
INTERCOM - MONITOR

VACATION TRIP

VACATION TRIP

Arranged to close store: Wed., |
Thurs. and Fri. to go on trip to
Dinosaurland; left note on store
that he would be closed P99 Dep

Trip to Dinosaurland for couple of
days Pl8:lQ-32

POWER PROBLEMS

POWER PROBLEMS

Out on arrival at 5:00 P6:38-41

Doesn't recall power problems
P60 Dep.

1

Family there, no power 5:00 - 7:00
P20-.5-59 - P21:22

No problems with electrical
P81 EU0

If you had prowler why oidn't you
call Police at 5:00? P18:5^-57

Never mentioned electrical problems P6:18-21

WIFE LEAVING

WIFE LEAVING

Never sa* wife

P6:29-30

Horrell said wife U D at mother's
P4:18-19
INTERCOM - MONITOR

INTERCOM - MONITOR

Stored 9:00 - 9:15 P5:26-27

ry 1/2 hr. to 3/4 hr.
P5:57-60; H:Z-S
it time 8:00 °4;28-31
/ 5-30 min. pc:25-26,32

1

BARBARA IIORRFl I

j

?d P:00 - 9:2 5

TRIPS "TO HOUSE

VACATION TRIP

GRFG ItORRClL

POWER PROBLEMS

G-eg said he was listening for
D-OMers D<:7,17,45"

Four times p*:6-7
1 to go to home when games
olaved P5.3:-43

1

POWER PROBLEMS

D 8:00 when rlav started
P4:35-3'
P5:23-24

GRrG HORRTLL
1/22/91

TRIPS TO HOUSE
Back anc forih all nioht P4:25
Not usual to oo tc borne wnen qames
nlaved D5:45
Eve-\ i/2 h*-. tc 3/4 hr. P6:7

Horrell acting nervous

P5:46

Dozec off 9:10-10:00 P6:7-13
Woke U D . Ho-rell out bad P6:7-13

POWER PROBLEMS
Doesn't recall any power pro
t>57 Dep

Thunder siurrrs: fairlv stormy
P66-67 EU0
WIFE LEAVING

WIFE LEAVING

WIFE LEAVING

Wife brouaht dinner to him 7:45
P22-39-45; 23:11-31

Wife came to store to say she was
leavina P54 EU0

Went to store to tell Greg
was leaving P59 Dep

Family went to mother's house,
took Volvo 8:00 P23:19-39

Wife left at 8:00; he suggested to
her she miaht want to oo up there
P50 EU0

Power off mostly reason for
ing overniaht with mothe
P59 Deo
INTERCOM - MONITOR

INTERCOM - MONITOR

INTERCOM - UONnOR
!

Sensitive: could hea- peoole
m q abound P67 DeD

Set up; Ba*-bar£ yelling; turned
down &78 EU0; P 1 2 2 Dec

TRIPS TO HOUSE

TRIPS TO HOUSE

TRIPS TO HOUSE

Greg oone for 1C minutes to oet
something to eat at 10:00 P4:43-54

Went to house ior snack at 9:30
P22:51-53

One trip to house at 9:30 P77 EU0

Went to house 6 times P26 Dep
Varying amounts of time (1-10
" m m . ) P58 Dep

EXAMINATION UNDER DATJf 12/3
AND DEPOSITION

1

|

TRIPS TO HOUSE

Never left store 9:30 - 11:00
P23:55-56; P26:13-16

Acting nervous Pl6:27-27
Something bothering Greg P74 Dep
Can't remember wny they stopDed
olaying nignt o r fire PI3 Dep

jt

DEFENDAN1
|

EXHIBIT

1

ANUDCPOSIUONS
DAVE WIGGINS
11/7/90
WAtKAiunn

—i

I
our,

Ami DEPo'sniwis

MORRILI.

BARBARA IIORRELL

WALKABOUT

WALKAHOUr

1/72/91
WALKAR0U1
1 ( h n k o d v a n , walked down f l a i i i
S t r e e t , up s i d e s t r e e t and a l ley - - does every n i g h t to
lock up P 2 G : l / - 2 l

II

GHrG IIORRELL

Adamson had l e f t and Wiggins
was j u s t l e a v i n g when he g o t
back from walkabout P55 EUO

JACfJUFS DTJtAL

li/i/go
TIME oar PACK - sttoQim
No iilra how long G» eg was out
bark b r f m e he ramp r u n n i n g
through U m o P71 Dep
Hi eg not in room when he
l e f t , Greg had gone out back
P78 Oep

J
I

Hoard 7 s h o t s ; l l o r r e l l s a i d
someone shooting af h i m ;
Jacques ran across s t r e e t ,
h i d for a couple of m i n u t e s ;
not lend smoke, embers f l y i n g
PG:3l-P7:5
l a s t timn he saw Greg and
hearing shots was 2-3 to 5
minutes P78-81 Oep

TIKE OUr BALK -

/

SlfOOHNG

/

flHE OUf flACK ~

SIKWriNG

TIME OUf BACK -

SlfOOflNG

Stepped ouf ba< k ; shots
f i i e d ; ran out l l u o w j h b u s i ness; d i d n ' t see any f i r e ;
reported shooting
P27.-27-31

v - 1 to 5 minutes to walk down
Main to Russett and up Russett
to a l l e y and back P127 Oep

Shooting and f i r e seemed connected to both her and Greg
PG5-GG Oep

f i r e not a c c i d e n t a l ; set by
shooter P<15:6-13. 5 4 - 5 7 ;
P70:i2-17

No reason to b e l f e v e f i r e was
e l e c t r i c a l P81 Dep

"Whoever shot a t Greg must
have had something to do w i t h
f i r e " P66 Oep
Greg i n t e r r u p t e d a t h i e f
P74 Oep

Believes he i n t e r r u p t e d
a robbery PI49 Oep
Gun was h i s P3l: r >S-G0
f u l l y loaded - 1 rounds In I t
P32:56-G0; 3 3 : I - 4

Saw 7 b r i g h t f l a s h e s o f l l q l i t ;
c i r c u l a r In n a t u r e ; r e d d i s h
w h i l e P129-130, 138 Dep

No enemies, no one upset w i t h
him P31:3-20

No enemies o r people w i t h
grudges a g a i n s t him P20 EUO

SEEING THE TIRE

At the very least 2-3 minutes
P81 Dep

II

!
I

I f was 5 seconds from shots
to Greg saying "Someone is
shooting at mc" P84 Oep
SEEING 1IIC TIRE

SEEING HIE TIRE

Saw f i r e w i l h i n 7 minutes of
running across s t r e e t P15-45
Oep

D i d n ' t know house on f i r e
when he r a n to n e i q h b o i s '
house PG7-G8, 132 EUO

CALLING WtfE

CALLING HlfE

CALLING wire

17:00 noon got h o l d of w i f e ,
t o l d h r r about IV and heat
being on P18:19, GO; 19:1-3

l t : 0 0 - 11:30 a.m. c a l l e d
w i f e ; t o l d her about IV and
heat being o n ; n o t h i n g d i s turbed P99-I00 Oep

11

GREG ASKING TOR RIDE

GREG ASKING rOR RIOE

GREG A5KING TOR RIDE

Greg asked f o r r i d e a t 10:45
p.m. a t end o f game P55 EUO

Greg asked for r i f l e e a r l y
that n i g h t , probably h e f o i e
the game s t a r t e d
P32:0-I5 Oep
first

CALLING.Hilt

Greg d i d n ' t c a l l w i f e t o r e p o r t f i r e P167 Oep

Saw l l o r r e l l af scenp, asked
i f he'd c a l l e d h i s w i f e y e t
P0:3-6
GREG ASKING fOR RIDE

SEEING THE HRE

time he had asked f o r
r i d e P35 Dep
LOCKS

LOCKS

LOCKS

Wife locks house when she
leaves P31:55-58

Wife normally locks doors
P125-12G Dep

Habit o f l o c k i n g doors when
she leaves P84 Dep

Said he locked doors i n f i r s t
I n t e r v i e w ( O c t . 9, 1990)
Now not sure i f he d i d
P34:18-5<1; 35:8-12

D i f f e r e n t key f o r each door
P79

Made sure t h i n g s were locked
when she l e f t P04 Dep

Locked f r o n t door a t 9:30
P54-79 EUO
Latch on windows - - d r y e r
vented through laundry room
window P40-41 EUO

Not aware of any f o r c e d e n t r y
P35:11-18
Window in laundry room open;
screen on window; not cut o r
a n y t h i n g l i k e t h a t P31:27-39
Greg, Barbara, m o t h e r - i n - l a w
o n l y people w i t h keys
P35:38-41

Greg, Barbara, m o t h e r - i n - l a w
had keys PI 17 Dep
|

Doors and windows were locked
b e f o r e f i r e P35 EUO
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EXHIBIT
NOTICE OF TRUSTEES SALE

%

.ilEKESM.

THE FOLLOWING DESCRIBED PROPERTY WILL BE SOLD AT PUBLIC
AUCTION TO THE HIGHEST BIDDER, PAYABLE IN LAWFUL MONEY OF THE
UNITED STATES AT THE TIME OF SALE, AT THE NORTH FRONT DOOR OF THE SALT
LAKE COUNTY COURTHOUSE, 240 EAST 400 SOUTH, S.L.C., UTAH
ON 29 OCT 1990, AT 10:00 O'CLOCK A.M. OF SAID DAY FOR
THE PURPOSE OF FORECLOSING THAT CERTAIN TRUST DEED DATED
11 JUL 1983, AND RECORDED IN THE OFFICE OF THE COUNTY
RECORDER OF SALT LAKE, STATE OF UTAH, AND BEING
DESCRIBED AS FOLLOWS:
TRUSTOR:

GREGORY S. HORRELL AND BARBARA J.
HORRELL, HUSBAND AND WIFE
TRUSTEE:
ASSOCIATED TITLE COMPANY
BENEFICIARY: ***
RECORDED:
13 JUL 19S3
ENTRY NO.:
3818010
BOOK:
5474
PAGE:
2083
AND COVERING REAL PROPERTY MORE PARTICULARLY DESCRIBED AS FOLLOWS:
ALL OF LOT 148 SOUTHGATE PARK, A SUBDIVISION
OF LOTS 8 AND 10, AND THE SOUTH ONE-HALF
OF LOT 9, BLOCK 33 TEN ACRE PLAT "A",
BIG FIELD SURVEY.
LESS THE 7 FEET CONVEYED TO SALT LAKE
COUNTY AS EVIDENCED BY THE RIGHT OF WAY
DEED DATED MARCH 29, 1940, AND RECORDED
APRIL 2, 1940 AS ENT. NO. 87445, IN BOOK
249, AT PAGE 214, SALT LAKE COUNTY
RECORDER'S OFFICE.
DATED THIS 2ND DAY OF OCTOBER, 1990.
ASSOCIATED TITLE-COMPANY,
A UTAH CORPORATION
TRUSTEE

BLAKEZT. HEIHER1
ITS: VICEZPRESinENT
FC-12B.6".

**ARLENE_E. BECKSTRCM, AS PEHSONAL-REERESENTATIYEIOF MARIEIK^OLSEN,
S TO AN-UNDIVIDED--1/2 INTEREST," ANDZARLEENZE. BECKSTRCM, N.ftf-f.KN-HKITBRRG,
S-TRDSTEE FOR GARY LEE MCDONALD, AS TO "AN UNDIVIDED J./2 -.INTEREST.

1000028
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PROOF OF MAILING

2770 S KUX 81
SALT LAU a n UT 84115

3133692 HO

Policy Number and Description

October 4, 1990

Cancellation Date of Insurance
Effective 12:01 A.M., Standard Time

August 31, 1990

^ a t e Notice Mailed

NOTICE OF CANCELLATION - UTAH
In accordance with the law and the terms of the above numbered policy, we are sending this
notice to inform you that your policy is being cancelled.
Your policy will not provide coverage beyond the cancellation date and time shown above.
Premium Adjustment:
If a refund of premium for the unexpired term of this policy is due you, it is enclosed or will be
sent to you.
Reason (s) for Cancellation:
Ineligible due to unacceptable credit report
PS to agents Ve suggest you cobtact 7BL Brokerage for possible coverage.
Information for Insured:
1. If the reason shown above does not state with reasonable precision the facts on which our
decision was based, you may request in writing clarifying information. We must respond within
10 working days of receipt of your request.
2. You have the right to request claim loss information regarding this policy. We will provide
you with this information within 30 days of receipt of your request.
3. H If indicated, this action is based on information provided to us in a report made at our
request. Questions regarding this information should be sent to:
Trim Unlnn Credit Bspnrt, Knx 3110, Fullerton Ca 92ilk
Thank you for allowing us to serve your insurance needs. We regret we cannot continue this
insurance coverage.
loaald Kuehler
Attte/rersoaal Lias* Uudervriter
BXtJa

TabF

March 18, 1992
CERTIFIED LETTER
RETURN RECEIPT REQUESTED
PERSONAL AND CONFIDENTIAL
Mr. Greg & Barbara Horrell
%Keith W. Meade
Cohne, Rappaport & Segal
525 E. First S., 5th Floor
Salt Lake City, UT 84102
Our Insured
Our Policy #
D/L

Greg & Barbara Horrell
5193692
10/3/90

Dear Mr. & Mrs. Horrell:
We have carefully reviewed the pertinent facts and circumstances of your claim and find
that we must decline payment to you for one or more of the following reasons:
1.

The fire appears to be of incendiary origin, for which an insured is responsible,
and, therefore, you are guilty of fraud and false swearing within the meaning of
the terms of your policy of insurance.

2.

You have breached the conditions of your policy by misrepresenting an insured's
involvement in the burning or the procuring the burning of the dwelling in
question.

3.

The Proof of Loss is fraudulent in that you deny any knowledge of the origin of
the fire.

4.

The Proof of Loss is fraudulent as to the items destroyed in the fire, the value of
the items destroyed, and the place of purchase of some of the items destroyed.

5.

You have breached the policy conditions by not completing the Proof of Loss
within a reasonable length of time. Your failure to do so has prejudiced the rights
of Farm Bureau Mutual Insurance Company.

6.

You have breached the policy conditions by not producing documents requested
at the Examination Under Oath. Namely, the income tax returns for 3 years.

Your policy provides: CONCEALMENT OR FRAUD
This entire policy shall be void, whether before or after the loss, any insured has
intentionally concealed or misrepresented any material fact or circumstances related to
this insurance.

0000200

Policy #5193692
Page 2
We hereby expressly reserve the right to assert all other defenses that we may have to
your claim, even though not enumerated above, as they become known to this
company or as counsel may advise.
If you intend to precede with litigation, strict compliance with the provision of the policy
will be required including the requirement to commence any action within 3 years after
the date of the fire. By this letter, we do not intend to waive or relinquish any of the
rights or defenses under the terms of this policy.
Sincerely,

Larry L Bachmann
Property Lines Claim Manager
jr

0000201
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Third t»i<i«oia»ui5iH^

JUN 2 4 1994
By frrW'^^^puty C l e r k
IN THE DISTRICT COURT OP THE THIRD JUDICIAL DISTRICT
IN AND FOR SALT LAKE COUNTY, STATE OP UTAH

GREGORY S. HORRELL and
BARBARA HORRELL,

SPECIAL VERDICT

Plaintiffs,

CASE NO. 920903327

vs.
UTAH FARM BUREAU INSURANCE
COMPANY, a Utah corporation,
and FARM BUREAU MUTUAL
INSURANCE CO.,
Defendants.

After consideration of the Court's instructions, you the
jurors are requested to answer the following questions.

Six or

more of you must agree on the answer to each question.
1.

Do you find by clear and convincing evidence that Gregory

Horrell intentionally set the fire which occurred at his residence
on October 3, 1990?
ANSWER:
2.

Yes

No X.

Do you find by clear and convincing evidence that either

Gregory or Barbara Horrell intentionally misrepresented to Farm
Bureau material facts concerning their claim as defined in the jury
instructions?
ANSWER:

Yes

No

X

-2-

If you have answered questions 1 or 2 "yes," then you
should sign and return this Special Verdict.
3.

Do you find by a preponderance of the evidence that the

second fire was a rekindling of the first fire?
ANSWER:
4.

Yes X

No

Do you find by a preponderance of the evidence that Farm

Bureau failed to diligently

investigate the facts surrounding

Horrells' claim to determine whether the claim was valid?
ANSWER:
5.

Yes >C

No

Do you find by a preponderance of the evidence that Farm

Bureau breached any of its other contractual duties of good faith
and fair dealing owed to Horrells, including the duties to: fairly
evaluate the claim; act promptly and reasonably in either rejecting
or settling the claim; deal with the Horrells as laymen and not as
experts in the subtleties of law and insurance; refrain from
injuring the Horrells7

ability to obtain the benefits of the

insurance policy?
ANSWER:
6.

Yes X

No

Do you find by a preponderance of the evidence that the

Horrells' claim was "fairly debatable" as that term has been
defined in the instructions?
ANSWER:

Yes

No

\

-3-

7.

If your response to Question 3 is "no," you may award

only damages resulting from the first fire.

If your response to

question 3 is "yes," then you may award the Horrells damages
suffered as a result of both fires.

Based upon this possible

limitation, what by a preponderance of the evidence are the damages
suffered by the Horrells as a result of the fires and/or as a
result of Farm Bureau's conduct for:
Damage to the Horrells' residence
(not to exceed $46,500.00)

HfiOtCQ
$jtj.

Damage to the Horrells' personal property
(not to exceed $77,000.00)

sM.OOO.oc

Damage for Horrells' loss of use of the
property (not to exceed $5,950.00)
Demolition
Other general and consequential damages,
as described in the jury instructions,
but not including attorney's fees
TOTAL
Dated this

_day of June, 19

sWSG'OO
$z,ffl?-CC

SlUOOrM.
tW.000*00

lat..

INSTRUCTION NO.

If the insurer has reasonable justification to deny the claim,
its refusal to negotiate or settle may not constitute a breach of
its duty.
An insurer may be reasonably justified in denying a claim if
the supporting law or facts are "fairly debatable" and would lead
a reasonable insurance company in similar circumstances to deny the
claim.

"Fairly debatable" means that the laws or facts which

support the insurer's position create a reasonable likelihood that
the denial of the claim would be upheld in court.

In determining

whether or not the insurer's position was fairly debatable and
reasonably justified, you should consider all laws or facts upon
which a reasonable insurance company would rely in deciding whether
to pay a claim.

This would include the laws or facts supporting

the insured's position that were either known, or that should have
been known, by the insurer.

Tab I
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1

THE COURT:

The Court is persuaded that

2

there is substantial evidence that the claims were

3

fairly debatable.

4

simply make the observation.

5

I make no finding thereon, but

I am convinced and persuaded that the

6

Court ought not to surrender to overzealous

7

advocacy.

8

following the law of the case that that was

9

established by the Court's order April the 19th,

And it is a more orderly way to proceed in

10

1994, in which I had concluded in written form that

11

the issues on the defenses would be submitted to the

12

jury on a preponderance of the evidence.

13

the heat of battle that was or didn't come to my

14

attention or didn't at least get from counsel to the

15

Court's mind clearly is beyond me.

16

hate to do it, the Court's going to grant a new

17

trial.

18

Wherein in

But as bad as I

I think that makes the other rulings moot.
MR. MEADE:

Your Honor, we did discuss

19

that at the time, and -- I mean, there is no -- there

20

is no case law that supports this one way or the

21

other in this state.

221

spoken, but the fact of the matter is that a new

23

trial in this case is going to take a lot of time and

24

cost a lot of money.

25

this different standard and we could go up and you

And I realize that you've

And we could try this case on

1

could be wrong and we will be back.

2

after an appeal is that we try the case twice.

3

you are subjecting the parties to the chance that

4

they may have to try this case three t i m e s .

5

submit that the -- that there's no logic involved

6

that given the fact that there's no controlling

7

law.

8

burden might b e .

9

appellate court what the burden is going to be.

10

13
14
15
16
17
18
19
20
21
22
23
24
25

case
Now,

And, I
in

case

You are just taking a shot at it as to what the

why spend another

11
12

The worst

And we ought to find out from some

$50,000 to get

THE COURT:

And

there?

I agree with the

practical

effects.
New trial is granted.
(Hearing

adjourned.)

